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CITIZENS NOT SUBJECTS: U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW AND THE DECENTRALIZATION OF FOREIGN
POLICY
Nick Robinson*

INTRODUCTION
[L]ocal assemblies of citizens constitute the strength of free nations.
Municipal institutions are to liberty are what primary schools are to
science; they bring it within the people’s reach, they teach men how to
use and how to enjoy it. A nation may establish a system of free
government, but without the spirit of municipal institutions it cannot
have the spirit of liberty.1

De Tocqueville found America’s “spirit of liberty” grounded in its
citizens’ engagement with municipal political institutions.2 It was here
that locally relevant and creative new policies were fostered, tyranny
was resisted, and the responsibilities of self-governing were internalized
by a democratic people. For De Tocqueville this “spirit of liberty”
required not only direct democracy at a local level, but also that
municipalities possess relative power over their own affairs.3 It was this
combination of local democracy with local independence that turned
“good subjects” into “active citizens.”4
Today, there are few municipalities in the United States that are
*

Yale Law School, J.D. 2006. Currently Fox Fellow at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. I
would like to thank Judith Resnik and Reva Siegel for their comments on an earlier draft of this
article. An earlier version of this article was selected for presentation at the 2006 Yale Journal of
International Law Young Scholars Conference. I am grateful for feedback from participants at that
conference, especially Paul Berman. Finally, I would like to thank Bruce Ackerman for his
comments arising out of discussions of this article.
1. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA VOLUME ONE 63 (Phillip Bradley
ed., Francis Brown rev., Henry Reeve trans., 1954) (1835).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 69.
4. Id. at 69.
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ruled through local assemblies of citizens. Instead, representative forms
of government are the norm. However, citizens’ involvement with the
politics of state and local governments (“localities”) still fosters and
protects many of the liberty interests De Tocqueville identified in the
1830s. Citizens continue to find that it is generally easier to access the
democratic process through state and local governments rather than the
federal government. This involvement is worthwhile for citizens
because localities still possess independence over many policies that
affect citizens’ lives. Although certainly not every citizen is politically
involved, localities create separate political communities in which
citizens can participate. Within these communities, issues of purely
local relevance are debated and decided upon, but also issues that hold
relevance beyond the localities’ and even the nation’s borders. In this
way, localities continue to be school houses of democratic empowerment
while providing a check against the power of the federal government.
It would seem that there are few areas of policy where the federal
government has greater justification for claiming exclusive control than
in foreign relations. A misstep in foreign affairs by a state or local
government can have adverse and potentially devastating effects on the
entire country. If a state or local government adopts a position that
differs from official federal foreign policy, it fractures the country’s
voice and negotiating power abroad. Moreover, it seems prudent to
centralize in the federal government the expertise and resources that
have traditionally been required to conduct relations with other nations.
And yet, state and local governments today have become deeply
enmeshed in international affairs as globalization has decentralized
foreign relations. On the one hand, localities have become more
autonomous international actors than they ever were or could have been
before. In pursuing interests with international implications, they tread
in a sphere traditionally monopolized by the federal government. On the
other hand, the internationalization of many formerly domestic issues
means that an increasing number of traditional state and local
government actions now have foreign policy implications.
The emergence of localities as actors in American foreign policy
creates new possibilities for creating more participatory and democratic
international relations. It also merely reflects a world where increased
interconnectivity across borders and the global regulation of markets and
values has collapsed local and international concerns. This article will
argue that U.S. foreign relations law has failed to address this new
reality. The Supreme Court has largely clung either explicitly or
implicitly to a jurisprudence that holds that the country should speak
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with “one voice” in foreign relations. Such a position is not only naïve,
but it also weakens American democracy. With globalization’s
commingling of the local and the international, a strong judicial bias
towards federalizing issues with a bearing on foreign relations will lead
to a hollowing out of the decision-making power of localities. States
and municipalities will risk becoming largely units of administrative
governance.
To be clear, this article does not challenge the view that under the
Constitution and its subsequent interpretation the federal branches have
the power to trump state and local laws and actions that affect foreign
relations.5 Article I, Section 8 and Article II of the Constitution provide
the legislative and executive branches power to “conduct foreign
relations through the enactment of federal statutes, treaties, and
executive agreements.”6 Article VI establishes the supremacy of these
federal enactments over state law.7 Article III grants federal judicial
power to cases concerning these federal enactments and controversies
involving foreigners.8 Article I, Section 10 prohibits a state from
performing certain foreign affairs functions, including entering into a
“treaty, alliance, or confederation.”9 The Supreme Court has interpreted
these provisions together to give the federal political branches a power
over international affairs that “cannot be subject to any curtailment or
interference on the part of the several states.”10 The federal government
clearly has the power to override state and local government policies for
the sake of a unified federal foreign policy.
Arguably, the judiciary should no longer accommodate the federal
government’s unlimited plenary power in foreign relations. The
judiciary should instead balance federal foreign policy concerns against
the interests of localities to ensure the federal government does not
wrongly usurp local power under the guise of its foreign relations
powers. Court cases involving localities’ interests in foreign affairs
often impact a diffuse and disparate set of issues. As such, there is
reason to believe localities may not effectively organize together to
protect their interests in these cases. Further, Madison and other
founders probably more generally overestimated the ability of states to
5. Jack Goldsmith makes a similar caveat in his work on foreign relations law in Jack
Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1619-20 (1997).
6. Id. at 1619; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; Id. art. II, §§ 2-3.
7. Id. art. VI, cl. 2.
8. Id. art. III, § 2.
9. Id. art. I, § 10.
10. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937); See also Mo. v. Holland, 252 U.S.
416, 432-35 (1920).
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resist federal encroachment on their power. This initial Constitutional
miscalculation may need to be corrected by increased judicial
intervention on the behalf of localities’ interests.11
This article, however, leaves to others to determine whether the
Constitution has been properly interpreted to give the federal
government a largely unchecked hand in foreign relations. This article
makes a more modest claim. It argues that courts should protect the
space that is currently open to state and local government action that
affects foreign relations–i.e., the space where neither the executive,
Congress, nor the Constitution has barred state and local action that
nonetheless affects foreign affairs.
Instead of protecting this available space though, courts have
adopted the opposite approach by repeatedly curtailing localities’ actions
in foreign relations even without an explicit conflict with federal foreign
policy or the Constitution. Part I of this article details the four primary
ways the Supreme Court has limited state and local action in such
instances: (1) the reading of a dormant foreign affairs power into the
Constitution; (2) heightened statutory and executive agreement
preemption for matters affecting foreign policy; (3) heightened dormant
commerce clause scrutiny in matters affecting foreign commerce; and
(4) making certain claims nonjusticiable under the act of state or
political question doctrines because they implicate foreign relations in a
manner that courts have deemed should not be judged.
These doctrines all find at least part of their justification in the idea
that the nation should speak with “one voice” in foreign affairs. This
“one voice” doctrine is borrowed from principles of international law,
which not only preference, but largely only recognize a univocal nationstate–primarily the executive branch of the national government. Under
the “one voice” doctrine, the judiciary’s senses become heightened. It
examines disputes before it to see if the federal government’s one voice
might be impaired in foreign relations, sometimes finding that it is even
in situations where the federal government contends it is not. State and
local interests are all too often undervalued or left out of the reasoning
process altogether.
After surveying in Part I these judicially created limitations on
localities’ actions that affect foreign relations, Part II then explores how
international tribunals increasingly circumscribe state and local actions.
Although none of these tribunals’ decisions are directly binding on
11. JENNA BEDNAR, THE MADISONIAN SCHEME TO CONTROL THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
21-33 (May 2002), http://www-personal.umich.edu/~jbednar/WIP/madison.pdf.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol40/iss4/3

4

Robinson: Citizens Not Subjects
ROBINSONFINAL.DOC

2007]

5/14/2007 12:48:46 PM

CITIZENS NOT SUBJECTS

651

localities, these bodies can penalize the United States as a whole for a
locality’s action that brings the U.S. into noncompliance with an
international treaty or agreement. In turn, U.S. courts may find that
these tribunals’ decisions, or simply a tribunal’s attention to a complaint,
constitute enough interference with foreign relations to strike down the
locality’s suspect policy. Indeed, the mere threat of U.S. judicial action
or scrutiny by an international tribunal may in and of itself be enough to
cause a locality to back down from actions it otherwise finds in its
interest.
Part III defends a limited decentralization of foreign relations.
Advocating decentralization in this context is not an argument to
necessarily limit the federal government’s role or its trumping power in
foreign relations, but rather to legitimize localities as actors in foreign
relations as well. The varied voices of the different branches of the
federal government and of U.S. non-governmental actors mean that the
United States has never truly spoken with “one voice” in foreign
relations. Further, there are a number of reasons to believe that
localities’ involvement in many aspects of foreign affairs has a positive
impact. To defend the decentralization of foreign relations, this article
adapts three of the traditional defenses of federalism: the benefits of
having diversity of state and local policies; state and local governments’
check on the power of the federal government; and localities’ ability to
empower citizens. It also addresses three often cited critiques of
federalism that can be applied to localities’ involvement in foreign
relations: the resource constraints of federal subunits; the danger of
empowering or protecting local perpetrations of injustice; and
federalism’s diffusion of accountability.
Part III then argues that courts are ill-suited to determine when
localities’ policies unduly damage U.S. foreign relations. Instead, it is
better to let the executive and legislative branches use their
Constitutional prerogative to decide when to occupy or preempt certain
activities within a field of foreign relations. Therefore, the federal
judiciary should only strike down a state or local law that affects foreign
relations when it is in explicit conflict with the Constitution or has been
validly and clearly preempted by the executive or legislative branches.
Although courts should largely let these other branches regulate state
and local governments’ actions in foreign relations, the federal judiciary
is better suited to regulate both state courts’ involvement in foreign
relations as well as their own. Therefore, a limited invocation of the act
of state and political question doctrines may at times be appropriate to
curtail the judiciary’s enforcement of some federal and state laws.
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Understanding the benefits of a decentralized foreign policy, however,
the federal judiciary should use these doctrines with caution.
Part IV applies the more jurisprudential and theoretical arguments
discussed in Parts I, II, and III to a series of examples of localities’
actions that affect foreign relations. Part IV differentiates these actions
into five categories. Such actions may: (1) foster exchange and
cooperation with other countries; (2) protect or promote local markets
and/or values in a manner that affects foreign relations; (3) judge other
countries’ behavior; or (4) influence the federal government’s foreign
policy. Localities may also (5) adopt or borrow from foreign or
international law. It is chiefly actions that are deemed to protect or
promote local markets and/or values (category two) that are placed under
the greatest scrutiny under international law. Meanwhile, it is both these
protective actions (category two) and actions that judge or criticize other
countries (category three) that raise the greatest level of suspicion under
U.S. jurisprudence. However, Part IV also notes that a restrictive
interpretation of foreign relations law has implications for all five
categories.
The examples in these five categories provide greater context to
understand some of the benefits of decentralizing foreign relations. For
example, state trade missions are designed to foster economic exchange.
Partially decentralizing these missions to the state or local level may
allow for greater economic rewards to the country as a whole than if
such missions were only initiated by the federal government. Localities’
actions that protect and promote local markets and values enable citizens
to have fuller agency over their local communities as well as their own
lives and provide a check against federal or international power. Such
actions may also encourage experimentation and debate over policies at
a local level before similar national policies are implemented or a local
standard gains acceptance across the country.
Local mobilization around a foreign policy issue can also have an
important precedent-setting effect on federal foreign policy. For
example, the South African anti-apartheid divestment movement
engaged citizens in localities across the country. Such local engagement
helps foster human rights moments in which a section of the American
public expresses support for a human rights-based foreign policy.
Arguably, such human rights moments encourage foreign policymakers
to promote similar human rights-based policies in relation to foreign
policy issues the public is less mobilized around.
There have been other proposals to strengthen participatory
democracy outside preserving the democratic role of state or local
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governments. Part V briefly addresses one of these proposals. James
Fishkin and Bruce Ackerman have put forward a strong argument for
having a deliberation day in local neighborhoods around the country
before national elections in which citizens would debate and discuss
amongst themselves the issues of the day. Evidence indicates that such
forums for deliberation do have an impact on voters’ views on foreign
relations. A proposal like deliberation day would likely get a larger
section of the American public to actively engage in issues of foreign
relations than simply ensuring localities retain independence in an
internationally saturated governance environment.
However,
strengthening localities’ independence addresses larger federalism
concerns that ideas like deliberation day do not. Instead, such ideas
should be seen as complimentary to a movement towards decentralizing
foreign relations.
In conclusion, this article argues that more than a change in the
mindset of the courts is necessary for localities to be effective foreign
policy actors. The federal government and localities themselves must
also recognize the benefits of decentralization and amend their
governance strategies accordingly. Finally, ordinary citizens need to
actively support a more balanced approach to foreign affairs in which
localities are concurrent actors in foreign relations with the federal
government.
A general theme of this article is that the drafters of the
Constitution did not envision the dominating and pervasive role foreign
relations would play in the United States. As such, the Constitution does
not fully address the balance of power implications of giving the federal
government, and specifically the executive, such a privileged role in
conducting foreign affairs. In Democracy in America, De Tocqueville
remarks on the isolation in which the United States was largely born and
spent its early years “[s]eparated from the rest of the world by the ocean,
and too weak as yet to aim at the dominion of the seas, it has no
enemies, and its interests rarely come into contact with those of any
other nation of the globe.”12 He notes the implications of this isolation
on the power of the President within the U.S. constitutional framework:
“[t]he President of the United States possesses almost royal prerogatives
[in foreign relations], which he has no opportunity of exercising; and the
privileges which he can at present use are very circumscribed. The laws
allow him to be strong, but circumstances keep him weak.”13
12. De Tocqueville, supra note 1, at 131.
13. Id.
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In light of globalization’s increasing enmeshment of foreign and
domestic relations, this article highlights a double fear. It is not only
that the federal government is given a new opportunity by globalization
to commandeer control over many areas of governance from localities,
but that the executive is strengthened in relation to the other branches.
In this context, citizens’ involvement in foreign relations at a local level
and the promotion of decentralizing foreign policy more generally
should be seen as a method, however imperfect, to regain a safer balance
of power within the government. There may be other ways of creating
this balance within the federal government such as by strengthening the
respective power of Congress or the courts in foreign relations.
Alternatively, more structural changes could be made such as
transforming the U.S. representative to the U.N. into a nationally elected
position.13 However, none of these alternatives so clearly engage
citizens at a local level to become politically active in the creation of
foreign policy.
The argument in this article for local democratic participation is
also, perhaps primarily, a humanist one. With more possibility for
participation, we become thicker citizens. We have greater ability to
engage in our communities and in turn more control over and
understanding of our own lives as humans. For Durkheim, government
had its own consciousness. Such a characterization highlighted that
although government at its root might merely be a shared idea in a
community of conscious humans, it could also have its own agency. The
state had its own logic that was removed, and even unknown, from those
that “thought” government into existence. He writes of a democratic
state that “[t]he closer communication becomes between the government
consciousness and the rest of society, and the more this consciousness
expands and the more things it takes in, the more democratic the
character of the society will be.”14
For Durkheim, it is the democratic state’s reflection upon its
citizens through its citizens that gave democracy a moral superiority.15
13.Although worthy and much needed inquiries, the overall relative merits of these different
suggestions must remain beyond the purview of this article (as must proposals about how to make
U.S. foreign policy more democratically accountable to the rest of the world).
14. EMILE DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CIVIC MORALS 84 (Cornelia Brookfield
trans., Greenwood Press 1983) (1957).
15. Id. at 91.
This is what gives democracy a moral superiority. Because it is a system based on
reflection, it allows the citizen to accept the laws of the country with more intelligence
and thus less passively. Because there is a constant flow of communication between
themselves and the State, the State is for individuals no longer like an exterior force that
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When we debate where and how democratic governance will occur, we
are battling over what choreography of thought will define our state and
we as citizens. Such stakes are not easily quantifiable. If our aim in
structuring governance, however, is not to reach definable utopias, but
rather to balance as best we can the competing interests and tensions of
being human and being governed, then we must take into account
governance’s transcendent depths and not just its readily chartable
currents.
I. U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW’S MARGINALIZATION OF LOCALITIES
When state and local government actions affect foreign relations,
the Supreme Court’s senses become heightened, finding preemption and
nonjusticiable claims where it would find none in a matter it deemed of
merely domestic concern. This heightened sensitivity is displayed in
four primary ways: (1) the reading of a dormant foreign affairs power
into the Constitution; (2) heightened legislative and executive
preemption for matters affecting foreign policy; (3) heightened scrutiny
for the dormant commerce clause in commerce affecting foreign
relations; and (4) finding some claims related to foreign relations
nonjusticiable under the act of state and political question doctrines.
State and local government actions that affect foreign relations, but are
not expressly preempted by Congress, the executive, or the Constitution,
can be challenged and struck down under any one of these doctrines.
The law in this area, however, remains unsettled and underdeveloped
leaving many questions unanswered about the constraints it imposes on
localities’ involvement in foreign affairs.
1. Dormant Foreign Affairs Power
In Zschernig v. Miller,16 the Supreme Court held that the structure
of the Constitution implied a dormant foreign affairs power that could
preempt certain state laws that affected foreign relations.17 Such a state
law did not have to conflict with any explicit federal law or policy to be
preempted.18 In fact, in Zschernig, the government filed an amicus

imparts a wholly mechanical impetus on them. Owing to constant exchanges between
them and the State, its life becomes linked with theirs, just as their life does with that of
the State.
Id.
16. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
17. Id. at 440-41.
18. Id. at 441.
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supporting the state’s position and denying it conflicted with federal
policy.19
The Oregon statute at issue in Zschernig v. Miller prohibited
inheritance by non-resident aliens unless they could show the property
they inherited would not be confiscated by their home country.20
Additionally, these non-resident aliens had to show that American
citizens enjoyed reciprocal rights of inheritance in the non-resident
aliens’ home country.21 The Court found that this statute gave Oregon
courts reason to probe and criticize the law of authoritarian and
Communist regimes22 and in so doing intruded into a “domain of
exclusively federal competence.”23 Justice Douglas distinguished the
facts in Zschernig from the facts in Clark v. Allen (where the Court had
upheld a similar California statute 20 years earlier)24 by claiming that the
statute in Clark only had “some incidental or indirect effect on foreign
relations”25 while the statute in Zschernig “affect[ed] international
relations in a persistent and subtle way.”26 In particular, it enmeshed
courts into probing the laws of foreign governments in a manner that
might be considered provocative during the Cold War.27 This judgment
of other countries by the courts could “adversely affect the power of the
central government to deal with those problems,”28 thereby weakening
the federal government’s position in foreign relations.
In his concurrence, Justice Harlan argued that the Oregon statute by
itself did not infringe on the federal foreign relations power and such a
broad reading of preemption in foreign relations could not be supported
by prior precedent.29 He observed that the majority had not shown that
the Oregon statute had caused adverse effects on foreign policy.30 The
mere possibility that the statute could have such adverse consequences
should not be determinative, he argued, as many state court decisions of
purely domestic concern had the possibility of raising criticism of
foreign nations.31 Instead, Justice Harlan found that the Oregon statute
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 434.
Id. at 430 n.1.
Id.
Id. at 440.
Id. at 442 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 434 (quoting Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947)).
Id. at 440.
Id.
Id. at 441.
Id. at 443-62. (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id. at 461.
Id.
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conflicted with U.S. treaty obligations with Germany and, therefore,
should be found unconstitutional.32 Justice White dissented in Zschernig
agreeing with Justice Harlan’s analysis that dormant foreign affairs
preemption should not be applied to the Oregon statute, but disagreeing
that the Oregon statute conflicted with any U.S. treaty obligations.33
Zchernig left unclear the reach of dormant foreign affairs
preemption. Under a wide reading of Zschernig, any state action that
had more than “incidental or indirect”34 effect on foreign countries or
carried the “potential for disruption or embarrassment to”35 the federal
government’s conduct of foreign relations could be struck down by the
court. Such a sweeping reading would bar any state laws that directly
affected foreign relations and even those that did not if they were
potentially disruptive or embarrassing to U.S. foreign relations. Under a
less encompassing view, states could interfere in portions of the field of
foreign relations as long as their actions did not in fact adversely affect
the power of the federal government to conduct foreign relations. One
could also read Zschernig to hold that dormant foreign affairs
preemption could only be invoked if it involved “a state policy critical of
foreign governments and involve[d] ‘sitting in judgment’” of these
foreign governments.36 Finally, Zschernig could be read very narrowly
confining it to cases with similar facts–in Zschernig the state court had
been unusually critical and inflammatory of its judgment of a communist
government during a time of heightened Cold War tensions. This
narrow interpretation of Zschernig is supported by the Court’s
unwillingness to overrule Clark v. Allen, which was a case with
substantively similar facts, but that took place in a different historical
and political context twenty years earlier.37
The Supreme Court has not based another decision on the dormant
foreign affairs power.38 As will be discussed, however, dormant foreign
affairs preemption has been invoked, although not relied upon, to expand

32. Id. at 443.
33. Id. at 462.
34. Id. at 434 (majority opinion) (quoting Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947)).
35. Id. at 435.
36. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 164 (2d ed.
1996), cited in Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, Ins. Comm’n, 539 U.S. 396, 439 ( 2003) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
37. Brannon Denning & Michael Ramsey, American Insurance Association v. Garamendi and
Executive Preemption in Foreign Affairs, 46 WM AND MARY L. REV. 825, 857 (2004).
38. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 439 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg noted in her
dissent that Zschernig has not been relied on since it was decided. Id. She did not suggest,
however, that it should be overturned. Id.
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executive agreement preemption in Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi39 in
2003. The continued ambiguity surrounding the sweeping doctrine
Zschernig suggests has created much uncertainty about the scope of
judicial preemption of localities’ actions that affect foreign relations.
2. Statutory and Executive Agreement Preemption
A. Statutory Preemption
In 2000, in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council the Supreme
Court articulated a heightened legislative preemption doctrine for
matters affecting foreign relations.40 The National Foreign Trade
Council (which represents many of the largest foreign companies
operating in the United States) challenged a Massachusetts selective
purchasing law that generally barred Massachusetts state entities from
buying goods or services from companies that did business with
Burma.41 Massachusetts had enacted the statute in protest over the
Burmese government’s notorious human rights abuses against its own
people.42
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court found that the
selective purchasing law was preempted by federal legislation that
created a national sanctions regime towards Burma.43 The court reached
this conclusion even though the national sanctions regime did not
explicitly declare that states could not take punitive economic actions
toward Burma on their own.44 According to the Court, however, the
Massachusetts law undermined “the intended purpose and ‘natural
effect’” of three provisions of the federal sanctions regime: (1) the
legislation’s delegation of discretion to the President to control
economic sanctions against Burma; (2) its limitation of sanctions only to
United States persons and new investment; and (3) its directive to the
President to develop a national multilateral strategy toward Burma.45
The Court argued that the Massachusetts legislation, by acting
outside this national sanctions regime, weakened the President’s
capacity for effective diplomacy.46 The Court noted:
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

539 U.S. 396 (2003).
Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
Id. at 367, 371.
See id. at 367.
Id. at 388.
Id. at 372.
Id. at 374.
Id. at 381.
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[U]nyielding application [of the Massachusetts legislation] undermines
the President’s intended statutory authority by making it impossible for
him to restrain fully the coercive power of the national economy when
he may choose to take the discretionary action open to him, whether he
believes that the national interest requires sanctions to be lifted, or
believes that the promise of lifting sanctions would move the Burmese
regime in the democratic direction. Quite simply, if the Massachusetts
law is enforceable the President has less to offer and less economic and
diplomatic leverage as a consequence.47

The Court made clear that there was heightened statutory
preemption of state law in cases affecting foreign policy. In particular,
the Court stated that it would give added weight to the opinion of the
executive branch in such cases48 and even consider the reactions of
foreign powers to the state law at issue.49 In other words, there did not
have to be as explicit a conflict in these cases with federal legislation for
preemption.
B. Executive Foreign Relations Power Preemption
Three years after the Supreme Court found heightened statutory
preemption in matters affecting foreign relations in Crosby, the Court
was confronted with the preemptive status of executive agreements in
Garamendi. Writing for the majority, Justice Souter found that like
legislation that ordered our relations with other countries executive
agreements with other nations could preempt state law even when there
was no direct conflict between the state law and executive agreement.50
Until Garamendi the Court had only held that executive agreements
preempted state law where conflict between them was explicit.51
In Garamendi, a California law required insurers to disclose
information about policies sold in Europe between 1920 and 1945 in an

47. Id. at 377.
48. The court stated that they had “consistently acknowledged that the ‘nuances’ of ‘the
foreign policy of the United States . . . are much more the province of the Executive Branch and
Congress than of this Court[.]” Id. at 385-86 (quoting Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd.,
463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983)).
49. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 385.
50. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 416.
51. See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937) (finding international compact with
Soviet Union undertaken by the President validated alleged confiscation of property); United States
v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (holding that executive agreement with Soviet Union that settled
claims against nationalized insurance company barred further claims of this type); Dames & Moore
v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (finding executive orders that created Iran Claim Tribunal preempted
petitioners claims against Iran in U.S. courts).
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attempt to help Holocaust survivors more easily bring claims against
these insurance companies.52 Justice Souter held that the California law
was preempted by an executive agreement which encouraged Germany
to create a voluntary compensation fund as the sole form of relief for
Holocaust victims of Nazi-era insurance company crimes.53 The
executive agreement, however, was silent on state information disclosure
laws.54
In showing a conflict with federal policy, the Court in Garamendi
drew parallels between the California legislation and the Massachusetts
legislation at issue in Crosby.55 Justice Souter noted that both pieces of
legislation affected the ability of the President to negotiate with other
countries and frustrated the mechanism of operation the President had
chosen to conduct foreign policy on a particular issue.56 The leap from a
broad reading of statutory preemption in foreign relations (where both
the executive and legislature were acting in concert) to a similarly wide
understanding of executive agreement preemption was novel, not to
mention questionable based on past precedent.57
In dicta the Court left open the possibility for dormant foreign
affairs preemption in the case, hinting that the decision in Zschernig
might not be as anomalous as some had concluded or hoped.58 Although
the Court did not directly rely on the precedent of Zschernig, it used it as
a mask of legitimacy for a precarious expansion of executive conflict
preemption in foreign affairs. Instead of relying on the dormant foreign
affairs power, the Court explained it would use the more traditional logic
of conflict preemption for its decision.59 As already noted though, this
preemption analysis was anything but traditional.60 Coining a new term,
the Court found an expansive “executive foreign relations power” which
preempted state laws with executive agreements.61
In determining a standard for when an executive agreement would
preempt state law, Justice Souter borrowed from the muddied waters of
Zschernig. He categorized the majority’s opinion in Zschernig as
preempting state actions from the entire field of foreign relations (i.e.,
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 401, 410.
Id. at 420.
Id. at 438 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 423 (majority opinion).
Id. at 424.
Denning, supra note 37, at 831.
Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 439 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Denning, supra note 37, at 856-57.
Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 420.
Id.
Id. at 419.
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preempting all state actions that had more than an “incidental” or
“indirect” effect on foreign relations)62 and Justice Harlan’s concurrence
as advocating preemption only in the case of conflict with express
federal policy in foreign relations.63 Justice Souter then found that under
either analysis presented in Zschernig the California legislation would be
preempted.64 The majority in Garamendi did not decide which of these–
field or conflict preemption–would apply to the “executive foreign
relations power.”65 In a footnote, Justice Souter, however, hinted they
might both be applicable:
The two positions can be seen as complementary. If a State were
simply to take a position on a matter of foreign policy with no serious
claim to be addressing a traditional state responsibility, field
preemption might be the appropriate doctrine . . . . Where, however, a
State has acted within what Justice Harlan called its ‘traditional
competence,’ . . . but in a way that affects foreign relations, it might
make good sense to require a conflict, of a clarity or substantiality that
would vary with the strength or the traditional importance of the state
concern asserted. Whether the strength of the federal foreign policy
interest should itself be weighed is, of course, a further question.66

Although the language is ambiguous, it would seem that when
faced with a state act that affects foreign relations the first test is to
determine if the act is “addressing a traditional state responsibility.”67 If
it is not, then it is presumably void under the dormant foreign relations
power. This portion of the test, which importantly is in dicta, adopts a
broad reading of Zschernig to be applied to state foreign relations
actions where there is no traditional state responsibility.68
The second part of the test is invoked if the suspect state action is in
its traditional domain. It weighs the interest of the state in the policy at
issue against the clarity of the conflict.69 Justice Souter rests the
decision on this second part of the test and Justice Harlan’s view in
Zschernig that if any state policy conflicts with the federal government’s
foreign policy it is preempted.70 To determine what severity of conflict
is necessary, the Court should weigh the respective state and national
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
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interests involved.71 Justice Souter found that the California legislation
at issue was sufficiently in conflict with an executive agreement to merit
preemption and held on these grounds.72
It is not clear from Garamendi whether the “executive foreign
relations power” needs to be articulated through an executive agreement
to preempt state actions. Indeed, in Garamendi the Court uses
statements made by sub-cabinet level officials to support the position
that the California law was in conflict with the executive agreement.73
Statements like these could potentially be used in the future to preempt
state legislation without even the need for an executive agreement under
a broad theory of the executive foreign relations power.
3. Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause
The use of heightened preemption is not just confined to statutory
or executive agreement preemption, but also extends to the dormant
commerce clause.74 The Court has moved away from a far-reaching
interpretation of the dormant foreign commerce clause to one that much
more closely resembles ordinary dormant commerce clause preemption.
Such a move is welcome, but may come under threat if the logic of
Garamendi is applied to future dormant foreign commerce clause cases.
In Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, the Court indicated
that the dormant commerce clause has greater reach when applied to
international commerce.75 It held that “[shipping containers] that are
owned, based, and registered abroad and that are used exclusively in
international commerce [could not be] subjected to apportioned ad
valorem property taxation by [California].”76 According to the Court,
when a state attempts to tax containers in foreign commerce, as opposed
to merely interstate commerce, there is an increased risk of multiple
taxation (since it is difficult for states to coordinate their taxation

71. Id.
72. Id. at 420.
73. Id. at 411; id. at 441-42 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
74. The Supreme Court has long held that state laws that are “inimical” to interstate
commerce will be struck down even if Congress has not acted. See, e.g., Southern Pacific Co. v.
Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945); S.C. Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., 303
U.S. 177, 185 (1938); City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978).
75. 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979) (“Although the Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, grants Congress
power to regulate commerce ‘with foreign Nations’ and ‘among the several States’ in parallel
phrases, there is evidence that the Founders intended the scope of the foreign commerce power to be
the greater.”).
76. Id. at 434-45.
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schemes with foreign countries).77
Further, the California tax
undermined the ability of the federal government to “[speak] with one
voice” when regulating foreign commerce.78
In 1986, the Court limited the impact of Japan Line in Wardair
Canada, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue.79 In Wardair the Court upheld a
Florida aviation fuel tax despite the applicant’s and the United States’
claim as amicus curiae that the tax “threaten[ed] the ability of the
Federal Government to ‘speak with one voice.’”80 The Court clarified
that although they found that the tax in Japan Lines prevented the
Federal Government from speaking with one voice in foreign relations
they did not thereby suggest that “the Foreign Commerce Clause insists
that the Federal Government speak with any particular voice.”81
In 1993, in Itel Containers Intern Corp. v. Huddleston the Court
upheld a Tennessee tax on containers where that tax avoided imposing
multiple taxation82 and the U.S. government had submitted an amicus
brief supporting the state tax.83 Japan Line was further limited in
Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Board in 1994.84 In Barclays, Justice
Ginsburg, writing for the Court, upheld California’s system of taxing a
portion of foreign corporations’ worldwide operations. The Court first
found that California’s tax system did not violate the interstate
commerce clause as traditionally applied domestically.85 The Court then
found that the risk of double taxation was acceptable as long as it was
not an “inevitable result” of the California taxation scheme and that an
alternative taxing scheme “could not eliminate the risk of double
taxation.”86 Importantly, the Court also required that Congress indicate
that it intended to bar the taxation system in order for there to be a
conflict with the country’s “one voice” in foreign relations.87 Although
major trading partners had objected to the tax, the Court concluded that
by not specifically prohibiting California’s taxation system Congress had
“passively indicate[d] that certain state practices do not ‘impair federal
uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is essential.’”88 Justice
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
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Ginsburg also rejected the petitioner’s claim that executive statements
demonstrated that the California taxing system interfered with the
federal government’s ability to speak with a uniform voice.89 She found
that it is Congress, and not the executive, that is given the power to
regulate commerce under the Commerce Clause.90
Wardair, Itel, and Barclays limited the heightened nature of the
dormant foreign commerce clause that was upheld in Japan Line.
Garamendi, however, which was decided after Barclays, raises new
questions about this jurisprudence. If there are strong executive
statements or orders surrounding a commerce clause issue, the Court
might find preemption under the executive foreign relations power or
give such executive branch actions new weight under the dormant
foreign commerce clause.
4. Act of State and Political Question Doctrines
The act of state and political question doctrines both limit
justiciability. Courts often use these doctrines to refuse to hear issues
that could potentially affect foreign relations. In relinquishing their role
as arbitrators of these disputes, state law or state common law is often
simply not enforced. As such, courts can use these doctrines to limit the
impact of localities’ actions that affect foreign affairs.
In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, the Supreme Court
assumed the competence to trump state law to create judicial rules of
decision of particular importance to foreign relations, such as the act of
state doctrine.91 The act of state doctrine is not found in the
Constitution, but is instead a judicially created doctrine that “arises out
of the basic relationships between branches of government in a system
of separation of powers.”92 Its classic formulation is that “the courts of
one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of
another, done within its own territory.”93 Like Garamendi, Crosby, and
Zschernig, the general finding of Sabbatino is that normal lawmaking
gives way when a dispute has international implications.94
89. Id. at 328-29.
90. Id. at 329.
91. 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964) (“[W]e are constrained to make it clear that an issue concerned
with a basic choice regarding the competence and function of the Judiciary and the National
Executive in ordering our relationships with other members of the international community must be
treated exclusively as an aspect of federal law.”).
92. Id. at 423.
93. Id. at 416 (quoting Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897)).
94. Paul B. Stephan, International Governance and American Democracy, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L.
237, 240 (2000).
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The act of state doctrine does not apply to every situation in which
a state’s actions are called into question. The Court in Sabbatino laid
out two considerations to help determine when the act of state doctrine
should apply. First, “the less important the implications of an issue are
for our foreign relations,” the more likely the court will not invoke the
act of state doctrine.95 Second, “the greater the degree of codification or
consensus concerning a particular area of international law” that the
court is being asked to apply to a state’s actions, the more likely the
court will not invoke the doctrine.96 Later cases have even further
constrained the doctrine.97 A court will take into consideration the
opinions of the executive branch in a potential act of state doctrine case,
but the courts have treated the executive branch’s observations as only
one relevant factor of consideration and not binding.98
The political question doctrine is invoked by courts when they feel
absolute deference to the other branches of government is appropriate.99
95. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
96. Id. The Second Hickenlooper Amendment, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982), passed by
Congress effectively overrode the specific outcome of Sabbatino by making it clear that an
uncompensated government taking is a clear violation of international law in which the Act of State
doctrine would not be applicable. See West v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 829
(1987).
97. E.g., W.S. Kirpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400 (1990) (finding that
the doctrine does not apply when a court only incidentally makes a factual judgment about an act of
state that may embarrass a foreign government); Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of
Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976) (finding the act of state doctrine does not protect foreign sovereigns
when they are acting in purely commercial areas); Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d
1355 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that the burden of proof that the acts at issue were acts of state rests on
the one claiming the doctrine applies); Republic of Iraq v. First Nat’l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d
Cir. 1965) (finding act of state doctrine does not apply to actions sovereign takes to confiscate
property in the United States).
98. First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 790 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). In First National City Bank, three Supreme Court justices in the five justice majority
upheld the use of the Bernstein exception which gives the executive branch authority to override the
act of state doctrine. Id. at 768 (plurality opinion). Under this exception, if the executive makes
clear that it does not want the courts to be barred from hearing a case under the act of state doctrine
a court would then proceed with the case without applying the act of state doctrine. Id. However,
one justice did not feel that the Bernstein exception needed to be applied in the case. Id. at 773
(Douglas, J., concurring). Further, one justice in the plurality and four justices in the minority
rejected the Bernstein exception. Id. (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 792 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Since then, lower courts have generally treated executive suggestions as relevant, but not
dispositive.
99. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962). The Court found that on the surface of any case
involving a political question there is at least one of the following formulations:
[A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking
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The judiciary has found such deference may be necessary in cases that
involve the foreign policy decisions of the executive and legislative
branches of the United States. Many times, this abdication of decisionmaking power to the other branches of the federal government affects
localities’ interests. For example, in Made in the USA Foundation v.
United States, the Eleventh Circuit found that the question of whether
the Senate must ratify the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) by the two-thirds of the Senate required for treaty ratification
was a nonjusticiable political question.100 As will be discussed later in
this article, NAFTA has far ranging implications for localities’ interests,
but the judiciary refused to even consider whether the United States had
properly bound itself to the agreement.
In 2006, at least three negligence suits against private contractors
whose employees were killed in Iraq were removed from state court and
dismissed from federal district court on the basis of the political question
doctrine.101 The courts who heard these cases held that even though it
was private contractors whose actions were in question a decision in
these cases would necessarily implicate the actions and judgments of the
U.S. military.102 In this way, the political question doctrine can be
applied to not only the actions of the federal government, but also to
those whose actions are intertwined in the federal government’s policies.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW’S IMPACT ON LOCALITIES
International law has increasingly scrutinized state and local
government policies. These challenges have come primarily in the areas
of trade and human rights. The arbitrators of international agreements
do not have the power to directly strike down offending state or local
statutes or policies, but can penalize or reprimand the United States as a
whole, thereby imposing collective national punishment for state or local
action.103
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements
by various departments on one question.
Id. at 217.
100. 242 F.3d 1300 (2001).
101. Fisher v. Halliburton, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 2d 637, 644 (S.D. Tex. 2006); Smith v.
Halliburton Co., No. H-06-0462, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61980, at *26 (S.D. Tex Aug. 30, 2006);
Whitaker v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1277, 1282 (M.D. Ga. 2006).
102. Fisher, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 644; Smith, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61980, at *20; Whitaker,
444 F. Supp. 2d at 1282.
103. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 27, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
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Investors have used Chapter Eleven of NAFTA to challenge state
and local laws and judicial decisions.104 In October 2002, in Mondev
International Ltd. v. United States a Chapter Eleven Arbitral Tribunal
rejected a NAFTA challenge by a Canadian real estate developer to a
decision by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.105 The Chapter
Eleven Tribunal held that the Massachusetts court’s decision to deny the
developer relief did not constitute a breach of Article 1105 of NAFTA,
which specified certain minimum standards of treatment for investors in
accordance with international law.106 In particular, it found that the
Massachusetts court’s decision that the Massachusetts legislature had
legally extended limited immunity from liability to the Boston
Redevelopment Agency did not breach Article 1105.107 The tribunal
indicated though that some types of immunity from liability, even if
granted by the legislature, would be barred by Article 1105.108
In June 2003, in Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, a Chapter
Eleven Arbitration Tribunal examined a multi-hundred million-dollar
Mississippi jury award against a Canadian company.109 The company
had argued that the award was exorbitant and was the outcome of
protectionist appeals to the jury.110 The NAFTA Tribunal rejected the
complaint on jurisdictional grounds, finding that all avenues of appeal
had not been exhausted in U.S. courts.111 Further, through corporate
restructuring the Canadian company who brought the case had
effectively become a U.S. company, thereby barring it from challenging
its own government under NAFTA.112 Despite dismissing the complaint
on these jurisdictional grounds, the Tribunal did find that the actions of
the Mississippi courts had violated Article 1105 of NAFTA and that the
company would have been entitled to recover if not for the jurisdictional

104. NAFTA’s dispute settlement mechanisms are found in Chapter Eleven, Nineteen, and
Twenty. See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
605, 639-99 [hereinafter NAFTA]. This article primarily deals with cases that have arisen under
Chapter Eleven of NAFTA, which guarantees certain standards of treatment and non-discrimination
for investors from NAFTA’s other member-parties. Id. ch. 11, 32 I.L.M. 639-49.
105. Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb.
Trib. Oct. 11, 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/14442.pdf.
106. Id. at 55.
107. Id. at 58.
108. Id. at 54-55.
109. ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. June 26, 2003), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/22094.pdf.
110. Id. at 2-3.
111. Id. at 61.
112. Id. at 67.
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faults in its case.113
Taken together these two cases might represent a foundational
moment in which NAFTA tribunals ensured future jurisdiction for
similar claims while denying relief for these two specific claims.114
These decisions laid out flexible standards for determining similar cases
that could easily be interpreted to give NAFTA tribunals broad
jurisdiction in the future. For example, in Mondev to determine whether
there had been a denial of justice under Article 1105 the tribunal created
the following nebulous test:
In the end the question is whether, at an international level and having
regard to generally accepted standards of the administration of justice,
a tribunal can conclude in the light of all the available facts that the
impugned decision was clearly improper and discreditable, with the
result that the investment has been subjected to unfair and inequitable
treatment.115

A Chapter Eleven tribunal has already found that actions by local
government officials in Mexico violated NAFTA. In Metalclad v.
United Mexican States, Metalclad, a U.S. waste disposal company,
claimed that it had been invited to build a landfill site in Guadalcazar
and was assured by government officials that a needed municipal permit
was a mere formality.116 Metalclad began construction of the site, but
“local [community] opposition resulted in the [m]unicipality denying a
construction permit [in] 1995 and [receiving] an injunction in Mexican
courts to prevent operation of the site.”117 In August of 2000, the
NAFTA tribunal found that Articles 1105 and 1110 of NAFTA had been
violated.118 In particular, the Mexican government had breached
NAFTA transparency requirements.119 Further, the tribunal found that
denial of a construction permit to which Metalclad was otherwise legally
entitled amounted to an expropriation of Metalclad’s property under
NAFTA.120 The tribunal awarded Metalclad nearly $16.7 million in
113. Id. at 70.
114. JOHN D. ESCHEVERRIA, GEORGETOWN ENVTL. LAW & POLICY INST., LOWEN, MONDEY
AND REVIEW OF U.S. JUDICIAL RULINGS BY INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION PANELS (2003),
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/research_archive/trade/LoewenMondev.pdf.
115. Id. at 7.
116. Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, at 14 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb.
Trib. Aug. 30, 2000), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/mm-award-e.pdf.
117. Simon Baughen, Expropriation and Environmental Regulation: The Lessons of NAFTA
Chapter Eleven, 18 J. Envtl. L. 207, 220 (2006).
118. Id. at 221.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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damages.121
NAFTA is not the only international trade agreement which affects
state and local laws and regulations. GATT, the WTO trade dispute
panels, and the WTO’s appellate body have found the United States to
be in breach of its trade commitments because of state policies.
In 1992, a GATT panel found that federal and state differential
treatment for in-state and domestic alcohol brewers in regards to taxes,
tax credits, and regulations violated GATT.122 The decision has
potentially larger implications because the GATT panel found that the
U.S. government was responsible for state law in violation of GATT.
The panel examined U.S. law and found that since GATT was part of
federal law the federal government could override inconsistent state law
under the commerce clause.123 Further, after reviewing U.S. Supreme
Court precedent the panel concluded that “the Twenty-first Amendment
grants broad police powers to the states to regulate the distribution and
sale of alcoholic beverages but does not grant the states powers to
protect in-state producers of alcoholic beverages against imports of
competing like products.”124
Finding no barrier to the federal
government enforcing its findings against the states, the panel dismissed
any suggestion to the contrary as merely pretext for noncompliance.125
The United States has a duty under GATT to take reasonable
measures to ensure observance of the provisions of the agreement by
regional and local governments.126 No GATT panel, however, has yet to
directly address a situation in which it found the state party did not have
the power to change the offending law of a governmental subunit.127 If
there was such a finding it is unclear whether this would affect a
country’s obligations for compliance under GATT.
In November 2004, a WTO panel found that certain U.S.
restrictions on overseas gambling violated the General Agreement on
Trades in Services (GATS). Antigua, who brought the complaint, only
121. Metalclad, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, at 35.
122. Report of the Panel, United States – Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages
(June 19, 1992), GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 206 (1993).
123. Id. ¶ 5.45.
124. Id. ¶ 5.46.
125. Id. ¶ 6.
126. General Agreement Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
“Each contracting party shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to it to ensure
observance of the provisions of this Agreement by the regional and local governments and
authorities within its territories.” Id. at art. XXIV.
127. Edward T. Hayes, Changing Notions of Sovereignty and Federalism in the International
Economic System: A Reassessment of WTO Regulation of Federal States and the Regional and
Local Governments Within Their Territories, 25 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 30 (2004).
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generally stated in its written and oral submissions that state laws
restricting gambling might be in violation of GATS, while the focus of
its complaint was on U.S. federal law.128 The panel, however, reviewed
eight state laws that restricted online gambling, and found that four of
them were inconsistent with GATS.129 The panel also found that
provisions of U.S. federal law restricting online gambling were in
violation of America’s GATS obligations.130
In April 2005, a WTO appellate panel reversed the decision of the
November 2004 panel in regards to the state laws. The appellate panel
found that since Antigua did not detail how the state laws violated
GATS in its submissions it had not established a prima facie case of
inconsistency. The lower panel was therefore wrong to examine these
state laws when they had not been seriously contested by either side.131
The appellate panel did not find that the state laws in question were
consistent with America’s GATS obligations or they could not be
challenged in the future, only that Antigua had not made a prima facie
case of inconsistency. The lower panel’s decision demonstrates that
WTO panels are willing to find that state laws conflict with WTO
obligations. It also shows Antigua might have some likelihood of
success if it challenged state laws that restricted online gambling in the
WTO in the future.
Although striking down the lower panel’s finding against state
laws, the April 2005 appellate panel decision held that certain U.S.
federal laws restricting online gambling were inconsistent with GATS.
In 2006, the United States adopted a bill that outlawed banks and other
financial institutions from processing online gambling transactions.132 In
March 2007, a WTO panel found that the U.S. had yet to comply with
the April 2005 appellate panel decision.133 It is still uncertain how this
ongoing controversy will be resolved and if state laws restricting online
gambling will eventually be challenged by Antigua in the WTO.
It is likely that the number of challenges made to state and local

128. Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling
and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R (April 7, 2005), par. ¶¶ 149-50.
129. Id. ¶¶ 151-52.
130. Id. ¶ 5
131. Id. ¶¶ 149-56
132. US Online Law Takes Effect, BBCCARIBBEAN.COM, Oct. 13, 2006,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/caribbean/news/story/2006/10/061013_antiguagaming.shtml (last visited Apr.
21, 2007).
133. Antigua Scores Again Over the US, BBCCARIBBEAN.COM, Mar. 30, 2007
http://www.bbc.co.uk/caribbean/news/story/2007/03/070330_antiguawto3003.shtml (last visited
May 3, 2007).
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regulations and judicial decisions will only increase in the WTO and
under international trade agreements like NAFTA. Meanwhile, the
United States also has responsibilities under a number of international
human rights and labor agreements to which it is a party. Unlike under
trade agreements, in which trade penalties can be levied against the
United States for noncompliance, the United States cannot be punished
for noncompliance with human rights agreements beyond reprimand and
bringing international attention to the breach.
The actions of localities have come to the attention of the oversight
bodies of several of the human rights agreements. The UN Human
Rights Commission that monitors compliance with the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights requires periodic reports from
states that have ratified the Covenant. In July 2006, when the United
States submitted its report, Commission members raised concerns about
a number of state and local policies.134 These concerns ranged from a
proposal to punish child sex offenders with the death penalty in South
Carolina, police brutality in Chicago, disenfranchisement of criminals in
Florida, the death of the homeless during a heat wave in Arizona, and
widespread disenfranchisement in New Orleans in the wake of
Hurricane Katrina.135 Members also made observations that implicated
state and local governance more generally from racial profiling by local
law enforcement to the high number of juveniles sentenced to life
imprisonment without parole.136 The Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights has heard several cases which implicate states actions that
charge the U.S. is in violation of its commitments under the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.137 The new Human Rights
Council has mandatory reporting procedures for members of the United
Nations138 that will inevitably place U.S. state and local action that
affects human rights under international scrutiny.
Although not specifically a human rights tribunal, the International
Court of Justice has enforced consular rights in cases involving the death
penalty. In Avena, the ICJ found that 54 Mexican nationals on the death
134. See generally U.N. Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Human Rights Comm.,
Consideration of Reports under Article 40 of the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/Sr.2380 (July 27,
2006).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Most of these cases involve the use of the death penalty by states. E.g., Javier Suarez
Medina v. United States, Case 12.421, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 91/05, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.124,
doc. 5 (2005) available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/cases/91-05.html.
138. G.A. Res. 251, U.N. GAOR, 60th Sess., at 5(e), U.N. Doc. A/60/L.48 (2006), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/A.RES.60.251_En.pdf
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rows of various states had not been given their consular rights in
violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.139 The ICJ
ordered the United States to review and reconsider their cases.140 The
United States accepted the ruling, and President Bush issued a
memorandum to the Attorney General directing the states to abide by the
decision.141 It is unclear whether states are bound by Bush’s memo or
the I.C.J. decision.142 As a result of this controversy, the United States
has withdrawn from the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations, which gave the ICJ jurisdiction over claimed
violations of the Convention.143
Besides the unknown binding effect of Avena, the decisions of
international tribunals are generally not directly binding on American
localities. U.S. courts though may grant considerable weight to these
bodies’ decisions, or even these bodies’ consideration of certain matters,
in determining whether to preempt a state or local policy that affects
U.S. foreign affairs. For example, the Supreme Court in Crosby noted
that the European Community and Japan had lodged a complaint with
the WTO that the Massachusetts Burma Law violated U.S. obligations
under the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA). 144 The Court
specifically pointed to the WTO complaint as evidence that the
Massachusetts Act was hampering the ability of the President to speak
with one voice for the nation on the issue of Burma.145 It also cited a
statement by the Assistant Secretary of State that the Massachusetts Act
was injuring the U.S.’s ability to negotiate with the EU to create an
effective Burma strategy.146 In the future, these statements may give
added weight to heightened legislative preemption as in Crosby or be
used to justify the invocation of executive foreign relations power
preemption as in Garamendi. Further, if the Court were to resurrect
Zschernig, it might find that localities’ actions, which merely create
139. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12
(Mar. 31).
140. Id. at 23.
141. Memorandum from President George W. Bush for the Attorney General (Feb. 28, 2005),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050228-18.html.
142. Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 666 (2005) (deciding that the Supreme Court will not
hear appeals involving the Avena or the Bush memos until all remedies in state courts have been
exhausted); Napier-El v. Johnson, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40798, *14 n.18 (finding that the status of
states’ obligations under the Avena decision were uncertain)
143. Adam Liptak, U.S. Says it has Withdrawn from World Judicial Body, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
10, 2005, at A16.
144. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 383 (2000).
145. Id. at 382-83.
146. Id. at 383-84.
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controversy before an international tribunal, could be struck down under
the dormant foreign affairs power. A court might also find that
localities’ actions that interfered with the trade commitments of the
United States might be preempted by the heightened dormant foreign
commerce clause.
International tribunals create additional political pressure on
localities to change their policies as well. For example, in 2004, the
Florida state legislature amended a tax on Brazilian orange juice after
being heavily lobbied to do so by the U.S. government after Brazil filed
a WTO complaint against the tax.147 The Florida state legislature had a
choice between retaining its discriminatory orange juice tax policy or
inviting the ire of the federal government. With the prospect of the
entire United States being punished for its actions in the WTO, it backed
down and amended the tax.
Certainly, some state and local policies deserve international
examination and condemnation. Such scrutiny, however, also takes
away local control. The Florida juice tax or the Massachusetts Burma
Act might be viewed as protectionist trade policies or representing
parochial interests, but they also reflect local values. It is not the task of
international trade tribunals to weigh the value of free trade versus these
local concerns, nor are these tribunals particularly well-placed to weigh
these competing interests. The answer is not to abandon international
agreements, whether in trade or human rights, but instead to involve
localities more when the United States is negotiating these agreements.
Most important for purposes of this article, it should be the federal
government and not courts that decide whether specific local policies
should be preempted when these policies come under the scrutiny of
international bodies. The Florida orange juice tax case demonstrates that
the federal government is willing and able to intervene when U.S.
foreign policy interests are truly threatened by localities’ actions even
when the locality in question (Florida) has disproportionate weight in
American electoral politics.
III. JUSTIFYING PARTIALLY DECENTRALIZED FOREIGN RELATIONS
In Garamendi the Supreme Court stated:
There is, of course, no question that at some point an exercise of state
power that touches on foreign relations must yield to the National

147. Todd Benson, Brazil Resolves Complaint On Florida Juice-Import Tax, N.Y. TIMES, May
29, 2004, at C3.
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Government’s policy, given the ‘concern for uniformity in this
country’s dealings with foreign nations’ that animated the
Constitution’s allocation of the foreign relations power to the National
Government in the first place.148

This echoes Madison’s concerns in Federalist 42 where he wrote
“[i]f we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in
respect of other nations.”149 As Part I showed, the Court has generally
found the argument that the nation must speak with “one voice” highly
persuasive. Except for in dormant foreign commerce clause cases, the
Court has usually found that a plea to “one voice” in foreign affairs
trumps competing state concerns.150
The Court’s jurisprudence not only dramatically preferences the
federal over the state and local in issues that touch on foreign relations it
also biases power allocation toward the President, whom the Court has
found has the “vast share of responsibility for the conduct of our foreign

148. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413 (2003).
149. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 232 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also,
THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 444 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The peace of
the whole ought not to be left at the disposal of a part.”).
150. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 381.
The state Act undermines the President’s capacity, in this instance for effective
diplomacy. It is not merely that the differences between the state and federal Acts in
scope and type of sanctions threaten to complicate discussions; they compromise the
very capacity of the President to speak for the Nation with one voice in dealing with
other governments.
Id. (emphasis added).
[I]n discussing the Import-Export Clause, this Court, in Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages,
423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976), spoke of the Framers’ overriding concern that ‘the Federal
Government must speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations with
foreign governments.’ The need for federal uniformity is no less paramount in
ascertaining the negative implications of Congress’ power to ‘regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations’ under the Commerce Clause.
Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 449 (1979) (emphasis added). “[W]e are
constrained to make it clear that an issue concerned with a basic choice regarding the competence
and function of the Judiciary and the National Executive in ordering our relationships with other
members of the international community must be treated exclusively as an aspect of federal law.”
Bano Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964). “The law thus ‘compromise[s] the
very capacity of the President to speak for the Nation with one voice in dealing with other
governments’ to resolve claims against European companies arising out of World War II.”
Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 424. (citing Crosby 530 U.S. at 381) (emphasis added). See also Chae
Chan Ping 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) (“For local interests the several States of the Union exist, but
for national purposes, embracing our relations with foreign nations, we are but one people, one
nation, one power.”); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941) (“Our system of government is
such that the interest of the cities, counties and states, no less than the interest of the people of the
whole nation, imperatively requires that federal power in the field affecting foreign relations be left
entirely free from local interference.”).
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relations.”151
This section first argues that the United States has never spoken
with “one voice” in foreign relations, so any unequivocal appeal to the
“one voice” doctrine is misleading. Second, it lays out a number of
benefits to decentralizing foreign relations and addresses some of the
critiques of such decentralization. Finally, it finds that although there
are areas of foreign policy where the federal government should speak
with a united voice unfettered by localities’ actions courts are not wellsuited to determine these instances. Given that the nation rarely has a
united voice in foreign relations and given the complexity of the
potential benefits and drawbacks of localities’ actions that affect foreign
relations, the courts should only strike down localities’ actions that are
explicitly preempted by the legislature, the executive, or the
Constitution.
1. America’s Multiple Voices
Although the executive is often the privileged voice in foreign
affairs, it must also compete with the legislative and judicial branches.152
For example, the Senate’s rejection of the Treaty of Versailles was a
harsh rebuke to Woodrow Wilson’s support for the League of Nations.
More recently, calls from Congress to withdraw troops from Iraq have
differed from, and perhaps undermined, President Bush’s stated plans.
A plethora of non-state actors symbolize, and in many ways speak
for, the United States abroad as well. These actors include large
American companies that invest in foreign countries; the entertainment
industry, which dramatically shapes culture abroad; American
missionaries who have started religious denominations and movements
across the globe; U.S. unions which have financially and otherwise
supported foreign unions in labor struggles; and U.S. based
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that may provide aid to other
countries or be critical of some foreign governments’ policies.
The actions of these non-state actors are rarely condemned by the
U.S. government even though they often complicate relations with
foreign countries. Indeed, the U.S. government can do little to control
the behavior of most of these actors. U.S. sanctions against a country
can prevent many of these non-state actors from operating in a specific
151. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 414 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
152. See Generally Sarah H. Cleveland, Crosby and the ‘One-Voice’ Myth in U.S. Foreign
Relations, 46 VILL. L. REV. 975, 989 (2001).
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country, but sanctions are blunt and heavy-handed instruments that are
difficult to use against a specific actor that is disrupting the federal
government’s ability to speak with “one voice” in foreign relations.
Laws like the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act153 and the Alien Tort
Claims Act154 provide some avenues for regulating how these non-state
actors affect foreign relations, but such laws tend to be the exception and
not the norm.
State and local governments are arguably seen as representing the
U.S. government abroad in a more official capacity than U.S. non-state
actors. The governments of these localities are democratically elected
and so it is more likely that they will be seen as acting on behalf of the
American people. Additionally, the federal government generally has a
greater ability to control the actions of these localities than non-state
actors. Therefore, there is a greater chance that nonintervention by the
federal government to stop offensive activity will be seen as federal
endorsement of such activity.
Such logic though should caution against court intervention in these
cases rather than encourage it. If localities’ actions damage U.S. foreign
policy interests, the federal government can easily preempt the state or
local policies in question.
Further, with the world’s increased
interconnectedness, it is more likely that if a foreign government takes
offense to a locality’s policy it can discriminate between the policy of
the locality and the policy of the federal government.155
2. Benefits of Decentralizing Foreign Relations
Democracy that takes place at the level of the nation-state has long
been considered suspect. As Robert Dahl and Edward Tufte observe in
Size and Democracy, two thousand years of democratic theory either
explicitly or implicitly presupposed that democracy could only work on
a very local level.156 The first democracies were city-states whose
citizens practiced a form of limited direct democracy.157 Both Plato and
153. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-3 (West 2006).
154. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West 2006).
155. Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 649,
653 (2002).
156. ROBERT A. DAHL & EDWARD R. TUFTE, SIZE AND DEMOCRACY 55 (1973).
157. Greek city-states, like Athens, did not give women or slaves the right to participate in
their democracies. Over two thousand years later, the United States that De Tocqueville traveled
still disenfranchised these same groups both nationally and at a local level. Neither Ancient Athens
nor the United States of the 1840s could rightly be considered a democracy today. The models they
provide for direct and participatory democracy are entangled in a history of oppression that only
allowed for the empowerment of some. Lessons drawn from these two experiences must take this
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Aristotle assumed in their work that democracy would only occur in
city-state like units of governance. For instance, Plato uses the example
of a population of 5,040 as an ideal number of citizens for a
democracy.158
Montesquieu and Rousseau, two of the thinkers who most
influenced the founders of the United States, both believed in small scale
democracy and largely believed democracy could only successfully take
place at this level. Rousseau argued for small direct democracies and
cautioned that “[t]he moment a people allows itself to be represented, it
is no longer free: it no longer exists.”159 In contrast to Rousseau,
Montesquieu wrote that representatives of the people were better at
discussing public affairs and making decisions for the community than
the people as a whole.160 He also felt, however, that democracy was not
well-suited to a large country because it was too difficult to foster trust
and a sense of public good on this scale.161
Inheriting a vast geographic area and a relatively large population
(approximately 3.9 million people in 1790),162 the United States adopted
a representative form of democracy on a national scale. Commitment to
democracy at the state and local level, however, remained strong. De
Tocqueville’s snapshot of the United States in Democracy in America
showed the continued liveliness of democratic institutions at a municipal
level in the early 1800s.163 An allegiance to states and regions was so
overwhelming in the 1850s and 1860s that it created the preconditions
for the South to attempt to form their own union during the Civil War.
Since the Civil War, there has been a general centralization of
political power to the federal government, most notably during
Reconstruction and the New Deal. In the 1930s, federal expenditures
systematic disenfranchisement into account. See ANDREA DWORKIN, Women in the Public Domain,
in LIFE AND DEATH: UNAPOLOGETIC WRITINGS ON THE CONTINUING WAR AGAINST WOMEN 19697 (1997) (on how Athenian democracy kept women out of public political life).
158. PLATO, Laws, bk. V, in THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 686, 692 (Benjamin Jowett trans.,
Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. 1952); Plato, Laws, bk. VI, in THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 697, 706
(Benjamin Jowett trans., Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. 1952). See generally, Aristotle, Politics, bk.
V, in The Works of Aristotle Vol. II, in GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD VOL. 9 (Benjamin
Jowett trans., Encyclopedia Britannica 1952).
159. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, bk. 3, Ch. 15, in GREAT BOOKS OF THE
WESTERN WORLD VOL. 38, at 422 (G.D.H. Cole trans., Encyclopedia Britannica 1952).
160. BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF LAWS, bk. XI, Ch. 6, at 177 (Thomas Nugent trans.,
Robert Clark & Co. 1873).
161. Id. at bk. VIII, Ch. 16.
162. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL
TIMES TO 1970, pt. 1, at 8 (1975).
163. The direct democracy De Tocqueville documented in Democracy in America occurred in
New England townships of two to three thousand people. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 64.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2007

31

Akron Law Review, Vol. 40 [2007], Iss. 4, Art. 3
ROBINSONFINAL.DOC

678

5/14/2007 12:48:46 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[40:647

per year finally became greater than local expenditures.164 State and
local democracy did not necessarily become less vibrant during this
progression, but localities lost relative power over their citizens in
relation to the federal government. Further, Americans’ political
identities became less attached to their region, state, or town and more
linked to the country as a whole.
The country though has also seen countervailing trends. The
second half of the 20th century saw a relative expansion of state and
local government in relation to the federal government although federal
spending remained significantly higher throughout. State and local
expenditures have increased from 1950 to 2001 from 5.6% of GDP to
9.8%.165
During this same period, overall federal government
expenditures changed relatively little, ranging from 15% to 23% of GDP
(15.6% in 1950 and 18.4% in 2001). These overall federal numbers
mask an important trend though because the Reagan presidency saw the
beginning of a large drop in federal spending that was not defense,
interest payments, or transfers (4.1% of GDP in 1980, 2.2% in 1988, and
2% in 2001).166 Meanwhile state and local spending consistently
increased during this time (8.6% of GDP in 1980, 9.2% in 1988, and
9.8% in 2001).167 This change in federal, state, and local expenditures
along with Supreme Court decisions supporting state rights and a general
shift in public opinion for greater federalism indicates a moderate trend
towards decentralizing many aspects of governance over the last 25
years in the United States.168
Federal systems are often adopted out of political necessity to
accommodate religious, ethnic, or linguistic differences between groups
from different geographic areas within the same country. These groups
are granted guarantees of limited autonomy while the central
government is granted limited overall control. This article does not
examine the political necessity of American federalism. Instead, three
other traditional justifications of federalism in the United States are
164. Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418 (1956).
165. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, HISTORICAL TABLES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2003, tlb. 15.3 - Total Government Expenditures as
Percentages
of
GDP:
1947-2001
(2002),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2003/pdf/hist.pdf.
166. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, HISTORICAL TABLES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2003, tlb. 15.5 - Total Government Expenditures by Major
Category of Expenditure as Percentages of GDP: 1947-2001 (2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2003/pdf/hist.pdf.
167. Id.
168. See Generally, John D. Donahue, Tiebout? Or Not Tiebout? The Market Metaphor and
America’s Devolution Debate, 11 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 73, 74 (1997).
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highlighted and explicitly adopted to show the benefits of more
decentralized foreign relations. These are the following: (1) federalism
creates a greater diversity of policies which are more locally relevant,
more economically efficient, and/or allow for more experimentation
with less risk to the nation as a whole; (2) federalism provides a check
on the over-centralization of power; and (3) federalism fosters thicker
citizens by creating a more participatory and locally relevant democratic
process.
First, federalism allows for and fosters a greater diversity of
policies. Decentralization can allow for a number of governmental
subunits to work on the same problem creating what Jack Walker calls a
“national system of emulation and competition”169 while also taking into
account local conditions and preferences. In a similar vein, Charles
Tiebout famously argued that if “consumer-voters” are mobile and have
full information they will sort amongst bundles of public goods offered
by competing local governments, thereby leading to the distribution of
public goods in an optimal manner.170
Certainly, not all localities perform equally well at developing and
adapting new policies. Research has shown that wealthier states tend to
be more innovative although local political situations are in large part
determinative as well.171 There is also reason to believe localities are
best at determining solutions to middle-level difficulty problems as large
problems often require more resources than are at their disposal while
decentralization can often confuse remedies for smaller problems.172
With these limitations in mind, however, localities are remarkably
adaptive, often correctly pinpointing problems and finding new solutions
before the federal government does.
Dissenting from New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, Justice Brandeis
summarizes the frequently invoked idea that states can be laboratories
for experimentation:
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave
responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with
serious consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of
169. Jack L. Walker, The Diffusion of Innovations among the American States 63 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 880, 898 (1969).
170. Tiebout, supra note 170. For a brief overview of the literature criticizing the theoretical
problems of the Tiebout model see Ken Kollman, John H. Miller & Scott E. Page, Political
Institutions and Sorting in a Tiebout Model, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 977, 978-79 (1997).
171. See generally, Virginia Gray, Innovation in the States: A Diffusion Study, 67 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 1174, 1185 (1973).
172. Ken Kollman, John H. Miller & Scott E. Page, Decentralization and the Search for Policy
Solutions, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 102, 104 (2000).
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the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.173

Of course, if state and local policies affect foreign relations, such
experimentation is not “without risk to the rest of the country.”174
Localities’ policies that antagonize other countries could sour relations
with important trade partners, needed political allies, or belligerent
enemies. Although such dangers should be seriously considered, they
are often overstated while in other cases the larger benefits of state or
local action in foreign relations may be worth the potential for some
limited adverse consequences. Further, the federal government can
preempt localities’ policies that it finds endanger the country or its
foreign policy.
State trade missions are an example of state action directed abroad
that carries little risk for the nation as a whole. States may tailor these
missions to the special needs of their business communities. The diverse
tactics and goals of these missions may ultimately be more successful at
developing business ties with other countries than if all efforts were
concentrated through the U.S. government.
A number of areas of formerly local or national concern that have
become internationalized, such as environmental policy, also benefit
from decentralization. Within the framework of minimum national
standards, localities can experiment with creative new environmental
policies, defraying risk for the country and creating support for
successful policies.
Second, federalism provides a check on the over-centralization of
power. Federalism embraces a “conception of justice” that implies that a
diffuse political ordering is both “necessary and desirable.”175 In
Federalist 51, James Madison reassures his readers that a federalist

173. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See
also, Justice Powell in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 567-68
n.13 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“The Court does not explain how leaving the States virtually at
the mercy of the Federal Government, without recourse to judicial review, will enhance their
opportunities to experiment and serve as ‘laboratories.’”); Justice O’Connor in Fed. Energy
Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 787-88 (1982) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(“Court’s decision undermines the most valuable aspects of our federalism. Courts and
commentators frequently have recognized that the 50 states serve as laboratories for the
development of new social, economic, and political ideas.”). Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering
States When It Matters: A Different Approach to Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313, 1325
(2004).
174. There are potential spillover affects to many state domestic policies as well.
175. DANIEL ELAZAR, EXPLORING FEDERALISM 84 (1987).
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republic provides a “double security” against usurpations of power
because power is not only divided between the different branches of the
federal government, but also between the federal and state
governments.176 Justice O’Connor picks up this theme in Gregory v.
Ashcroft where she remarks that “[j]ust as the separation and
independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government
serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch,
a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal
Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either
front.”177
As areas of traditional local governance increasingly become
objects of international concern there is an increased danger that
localities will be weakened in their ability to act as a counterweight to
federal and international power. Further, localities can play an active
role in checking abuses of federal foreign policy in areas not
traditionally associated with local governance.
For example, localities may be able to resist perceived misuses of
federal power that touch on foreign relations if they require the
assistance of local authorities to implement. Several cities, such as San
Francisco and Detroit, have passed resolutions denouncing the U.S.
Patriot Act, and some cities have even gone so far as to decline to
provide assistance to federal authorities in any instance where civil
liberties might be jeopardized.178
As will be discussed in the next section, localities have also taken a
number of actions to oppose or attempt to change federal foreign policy,
such as passing resolutions condemning the war in Iraq or adopting
“Buy America” laws. These actions in and of themselves may have
questionable impact on any perceived abuses of foreign policy decisionmaking power in Washington D.C., but they mobilize citizens around
foreign policy issues at a local level.
This mobilization of citizens is perhaps the greatest check on
usurpations of power by the federal government and leads to the third
justification for federalism in foreign relations: federalism creates
control and independence at a local and state level which encourages
176. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 291 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
177. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991). See also Chief Justice Rehnquist in
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (“This constitutionally mandated division of
authority ‘was adopted by the Framers to ensure protection of our fundamental liberties.’”); Justice
Scalia in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 (1997) (“The separation of the two spheres is
one of the Constitution’s protections of liberty.”). Chemerinsky, supra note 179, at 1325.
178. Vikram David Amar, Converse § 1983 Suits in Which States Police Federal Agents: An
Idea Whose Time Has Arrived, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1369, 1370 (2004).
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citizen participation and empowerment.179
Although fewer people vote in local elections than in national
elections (in part because local elections tend to be more lop-sided
affairs), more people try to influence local politics than national
politics.180 State and local politicians are usually more accessible than
national ones. It is also often easier to create local and state
constituencies. Sometimes these state or local constituencies are
connected with or develop into national constituencies, but it is the
chance to participate locally and impact the governance of one’s locality
that often mobilizes those involved. The idea that local action may then
turn into a national movement can create synergetic inspiration.
State and local democracy leads to large reservoirs of engaged and
committed citizens participating in a diverse array of political
communities. Not every citizen will take the opportunity to engage with
the governments of their localities, but many will. Local political
communities’ involvement in questions of foreign relations ensures that
debates around these topics will occur at multiple levels of government
and in multiple forums. With pools of active and committed citizens, it
is then more likely these citizens can and will check an overzealous
Congress or executive. The involvement of engaged political classes in
localities who also participate in national politics makes it more likely
that the potential for tyranny in the federal government’s policies will be
checked both here and abroad.
To further illuminate localities’ role in foreign relations, it is
helpful to address three critiques of decentralizing foreign relations that
also draw off of traditional critiques of federalism in general. First, the
federal government has superior resources and expertise in foreign
relations so localities’ involvement in foreign relations will therefore
lead to unwise or underdeveloped foreign policy. Second, given
freedom in the arena of foreign policy, localities may pursue unjust
policies. Third, involvement of localities in foreign relations confuses
who is accountable for foreign policy.
The federal government has an unmatched institutional capacity to
develop, shape, and implement a comprehensive foreign policy for the
nation. Many state and local representatives are rightly hesitant to take
on foreign policy issues because they correctly perceive their expertise
to be in local decision-making and not in foreign decision-making.
Individual citizens often find themselves similarly intimidated by foreign
179. ELAZAR, supra note 181, at 8.
180. DAHL & TUFTE, supra note 162, at 55-57.
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policy matters.
Max Weber observed that “[u]nder normal conditions, the power
position of a fully developed bureaucracy is always overtowering. The
‘political master’ finds himself in the position of the ‘dilettante’ who
stands opposite the ‘expert,’ facing the trained official who stands within
the management of administration.”181 There is perhaps no bureaucracy
as seemingly impenetrable to citizens as that which has developed
around foreign relations. Multiple agencies deal with a plethora of
issues that surround our relations with countries. Citizens often know
little about the countries with which these agencies deal. Terms like
“national security” and “national interest” often intimidatingly loom in
the background. Even the term “foreign relations” still connotes a
certain degree of untouchable importance and danger.
The information and expertise differential between local and federal
decision-makers and officials may seem overpowering when looked at
broadly,182 but local and state officials actually have a potential
information advantage in many foreign relations issues such as fostering
trade. Further, with an interconnected world a great deal of information
is available to legislators, and they have become savvier at interpreting
it. State and local legislators can also take their cue from the federal
government. For example, the legislators of many localities likely felt
more comfortable condemning the regime in Sudan after the federal
government stated genocide was occurring in Darfur. Most importantly,
localities are not developing a comprehensive foreign policy, but instead
are crafting a foreign policy that furthers their localities’ more limited
interests.
A second critique of federalism is that if localities are given too
much power they will pursue narrow-minded or unjust ends. Madison
wrote in Federalist 10 that the tyranny of the majority could be checked
more easily in a larger country because it was less likely they would
share common enough interests to consistently suppress the rights of

181. MAX WEBER, FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 232 (H. H. Gerth and C. Wright
Mills eds. and trans., 1946).
182. Id. at 229 (“The ruled for their part cannot dispense with or replace the bureaucratic
apparatus of authority once it exists. For this bureaucracy rests upon expert training, a functional
specialization of work, and an attitude set for habitual and virtuoso-like mastery of single yet
methodically integrated functions. If the official stops working, or if his work is forcefully
interrupted, chaos results, and it is difficult to improvise replacements from among the governed
who are fit to master such chaos.”). Of course, no one is suggesting the U.S. dispense with its
federal foreign policy bureaucracy, but only also allow a space for state and local decision-making
in foreign relations.
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others.183 Indeed, many who grew up during the Civil Rights era in the
United States associate state and local governments with racist laws in
the American South that were entrenched in localities. These laws were
only ultimately purged through the commitment of the national
government. Many have argued for international human rights and trade
regimes so that people and markets under localities’ control are not
subject to parochial policies. They claim that localities’ actions not in
line with these commitments can only weaken the high standards of
these international regimes.
There are at least two reasons to doubt the validity of this criticism.
First, if localities are not involved in and do not accept the validity of
international agreements, these agreements can seem hollow and
illegitimate no matter how just their goals purport to be. International
agreements and the norms they promote are not as likely to be
successfully internalized without local involvement and participation in
the development, contestation, and implementation of these agreements.
Second, history has shown localities were often on the forefront of
causes of justice. An examination of American history shows a number
of notable examples where state and local governments took the lead in
protecting basic human rights. For example, the Constitution initially
entrenched a system that would favor the continuation of slavery.184
While the federal government actively condoned slavery, northern states
banned its practice and worked towards its national abolition.
Localities also pushed women’s suffrage before the national
government. In 1869 the Wyoming territory accorded women equal
rights with men to vote and hold office, and in 1890 it entered the United
States as the first woman-suffrage state.185 By 1917, 11 states – all in
the west – had full suffrage for women.186 Suffrage advocates used the
example of these states to successfully lobby for the 19th amendment,
which was adopted in 1920.
It is beyond the scope of this article to predict if greater or less
federal or local control over the issues of slavery or women’s suffrage
would have hastened or slowed these moves towards freedom and
equality at the national level. Both the abolitionist and suffrage

183. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 51 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
184. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 20-21 (2005).
185. Id. at 419.
186. THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE YEARBOOK 1917, at 21 (Martha Stapler ed., 1917), available at
http://memory.loc.gov/cgibin/ampage?collId=rbnawsa&fileName=n7468/rbnawsan7468.db&recNum=19&itemLink=r?amme
m/naw:@field(DOCID+@lit(rbnawsan7468div11)):%23n7468020&linkText=1.
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movements, however, leveraged state and local action to pursue their
national objectives. A certain decentralization of power to localities
should appeal to any advocate for justice. State and local governments
have an important role to play in decrying the injustices of the federal
government and international treaty regimes.
A third critique of federalism emphasizes the decrease in
accountability as more levels of government become involved in an area
of policy. In many ways accountability for foreign relations, however,
remains much clearer in a partially decentralized system than in most
areas of domestic policy. The federal government is clearly to blame for
mistakes in a distant war and not one’s local or state government.
Meanwhile, a state government is to blame for a state trade mission that
mishandles tax payer money without producing any business for the
state. Similarly, although a citizen should not expect their state to end
apartheid in South Africa, they may hold them accountable for not
joining a divestment campaign aimed at this goal. Citizens should not
hold their locality’s government accountable for the unfolding of world
events, but they can hold it accountable for how it reacts to these events.
Dahl and Tufte observe that “[n]o single type of size of unit is
optimal for achieving the twin goals of citizen effectiveness and system
capacity.”187 When the federal government all but monopolized foreign
relations, it seemed difficult for a citizen to impact formulation of these
policies. Today, localities have an increasingly larger role as actors in
foreign relations. It is generally easier for citizens to affect their
localities’ policies than to affect national ones. Most localities, however,
do not have the capacity to have much effect on large global issues.
Instead, their goals in foreign relations must be more modest: fostering
productive trade and other exchanges with other countries, protecting
their own values and markets, decrying international injustices, or
pressuring the federal government to change its foreign policy in line
with the localities’ interests. In a globalized world, foreign relations
become a broader concept. Both the federal government and state and
local governments have increased responsibility in foreign relations. In
turn, we should work to democratize foreign relations at all these levels
of government recognizing the strengths and weaknesses of each level of
government.

187. DAHL & TUFTE, supra note 162, at 138.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2007

39

Akron Law Review, Vol. 40 [2007], Iss. 4, Art. 3
ROBINSONFINAL.DOC

686

5/14/2007 12:48:46 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[40:647

3. Judicial Implications
The U.S. has never spoken with “one voice” in foreign relations
and certainly does not today. Further, the benefits of decentralizing
foreign policy to include the involvement of localities are numerous.
Given the pervasive nature of globalization, there is little reason to
believe foreign relations should be the soul domain of the federal
government. Instead, as Judith Resnik has argued more generally,
categories in federalism are rarely truly bounded. We should recognize
“that many categories are intertwined in lawmaking enterprises and that
more than one source of legal regulation is likely to apply to any set of
behaviors.”188
There are clearly times that the U.S. must act with a united voice,
but the legislature and executive are better suited than the judiciary to
determine when localities’ actions are a genuine threat to the nation’s
foreign relations interests.189 These branches are better acquainted with
the nation’s foreign policy and can more efficiently and accurately target
localities’ actions that adversely affect foreign relations than courts.
Also, giving broad preemption power to the judiciary may result in
diverse decisions by lower courts in the same area of foreign relations,
creating further confusion.190 Therefore, courts should abandon their
heightened preemption analysis in the field of foreign relations. They
should only preempt localities’ actions in foreign relations when they are
explicitly required to by the executive, the legislature, or the
Constitution.
Although courts should let the other branches of government
regulate localities’ actions in foreign relations, courts are better suited to
determine when their own actions may adversely affect foreign relations.
As a result, there may be instances when a court should find a dispute
nonjusticiable because of the implication of a judgment on foreign
relations. When coming to such a conclusion, the court should weigh
the interest localities have in the judicial resolution of these cases. A
court should not overestimate the need to use these doctrines of
nonjusticiability.
Frequently a decision will not have as dire
consequences on foreign relations as the courts imagine. Further, the
executive and Congress can often pass laws to limit courts’ jurisdiction
if they do overreach. Finally, an overzealous use of the act of state and
188. Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111 YALE
L.J. 619, 622 (2001).
189. Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 1714.
190. Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 1694.
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political question doctrines on issues that affect foreign relations will
keep courts out of an ever-increasing number of disputes, many of which
could benefit from the judiciary’s intervention.
IV. IN CONTEXT: LOCALITIES’ ACTIONS THAT AFFECT FOREIGN
RELATIONS
Not all localities’ actions that affect foreign relations do so in the
same way. Such actions may: (1) foster exchange and cooperation with
other countries; (2) protect or promote local markets and/or values in a
manner that affects foreign relations; (3) judge other countries’ behavior;
or (4) influence the federal government’s foreign policy. Localities may
also (5) adopt or borrow from international or foreign law. This part of
the article provides examples for each of these categories to make the
implications of the arguments laid out so far more tangible.
These examples demonstrate the varied and sometimes complex
ways localities affect foreign relations. Some brief analysis is given to
demonstrate how foreign relations law is constraining or could constrain
localities’ actions in each of the five categories. In particular, localities’
actions that affect foreign relations in categories two and three are most
likely to come under the scrutiny of domestic law, while activities in
category two are most likely to be found suspect by international law.
These examples, however, also show that no category is without
scrutiny from U.S. law. Some actions may fit into more than one
category. For example, a procurement policy like the one at issue in
Crosby may be an attempt to influence foreign policy (category four),
but it also fits in categories two and three. Further, if localities are
consistently told by the courts that their business is not foreign relations,
this may have a chilling effect on activities in all of these categories.
1. Policies that Foster Exchange and Cooperation with Other Countries
Localities’ policies that foster exchange and cooperation with other
countries are one of the least scrutinized categories under domestic or
international law. State and local governments’ involvement in these
activities, however, especially concerning trade promotion, demonstrates
how localities have become not just occasional, but routine international
actors. Arguably, America’s foreign policy gains more from these
numerous and diverse exchanges to promote business with other
countries by localities than if the federal government attempted to
centralize this cooperation. Localities emulate each other’s tactics to
strengthen exchanges with foreign countries and often compete for
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business. Citizens also become engaged in these exchanges, thereby
furthering citizen involvement and exposure to foreign affairs.
Bayless Manning noted in the 1970s that “[t]he economic
interdependence of the modern world is more than international. It is
also inter-local.”191 Indeed, localities today tirelessly promote economic
activity with foreign countries and foreign localities both to create
markets for their products and to attract overseas investment.192
Although states have long sent trade delegations abroad, the
number of these delegations increased greatly during the 1990s as states
gained a new awareness of the importance of international trade, the
amount of international trade increased, and larger state budgets made
such delegations possible.193 In 1980 there were only four overseas
offices maintained by states, but by 2002 this had increased to 240
overseas offices.194 States also cooperate with one another to coordinate
economic outreach overseas.195
Friendship state or partnership
relationships between states and subunits of other countries are created
to encourage trade and cultural exchange as well.196 Cities across the
U.S. have promoted their businesses through sister-city programs197 as
well as through the U.S. Conference of Mayors.
Other countries or sub-national units often make specific attempts
to create stronger economic ties with specific states. For example, at
191. Bayless Manning, The Congress, The Executive, and Intermestic Affairs: Three
Proposals, 55 FOREIGN AFF. 306, 309 (1977).
192. See generally, Daniel Halberstam, The Foreign Affairs of Federal Systems: A National
Perspective on the Benefits of State Participation, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1015, 1028-33 (2001).
193. CHRIS WHATLEY, STATE OFFICIAL’S GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 3 (2003),
available at http://www.csg.org/pubs/Documents/SOG03InternationalAffairs.pdf.
194. Id. at 3, 49-51.
195. For example, the National Association of State Development Agencies (NASDA)
organizes trade and investment missions as well as helps educate state economic development
directors about attracting investment. NASDA Website, International Business Development
Division Description, available at http://www.nasda.com/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2006); The Council
of American States in Europe coordinates the activities of U.S. States with offices in Western
Europe. EARL H. FRY, THE EXPANDING ROLE OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN U.S.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 68 (1998).
196. It is estimated some “90% of states maintain partnerships or working relationships with
foreign jurisdictions.” WHATLEY, supra note 194, at 13.
197. Pat Guinane, State trade office plays matchmaker as Quincy courts China, ILLINOIS
ISSUES, Feb. 2005 (detailing trade mission sponsored by the state of Illinois between Quincy, IL,
and its sister-city Jiaxing, China); HEIDI HOBBS, CITY HALL GOES ABROAD: THE FOREIGN POLICY
OF LOCAL POLITICS 2 (1994) (describing how San Francisco and Shanghai created their sister-city
relationship to help foster trade). In 2005, “Sister Cities International represented over 2,500
communities in 126 countries around the world.” See Sister-cities international website, Frequently
Asked Questions at http://www.sister-cities.org/sci/aboutsci/faqs (last visited Dec. 30 2006). Sistercities international is a partially federally funded organization dedicated to “increased global
cooperation, cultural exchange, and economic development.” Id.
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least 35 countries have foreign trade offices in California alone.198
Foreign leaders will meet with state government officials while touring
the United States,199 and foreign companies will often use state
governors as a single point of contact to navigate regulatory and political
hurdles.200
Some have argued that competition between state and local
governments for business strengthens free markets and thereby creates
greater economic growth.201 Others have argued that it is not clear such
competition will create growth202 and express concern that such overt
competition between localities sets off a regulatory race to the bottom
and increases inequalities.203 Certainly, many foreign (and domestic
companies) expect large tax breaks and other subsidies before deciding
to start major operations in a given locality.
Localities foster other exchanges with foreign countries that are not
purely economic. One of the principal ways in which state and local
governments create connections with foreign countries is by developing
the education systems that shape their citizens global worldview,
including the training of foreign language skills and the teaching of
history of other countries.204
A number of states have developed environmental partnerships with
other countries to share knowledge and often aid these countries in their
environmental
programs.205
California
Governor
Arnold
Schwarzenegger and British Prime Minister Tony Blair signed a formal
198. California Business Portal, Foreign Trade Offices in California, available at
http://www.ss.ca.gov/business/ibrp/trade_offices.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2006). Sometimes these
foreign trade offices are sub-national units present in the United States such as the State of
Bavaria’s, South West of England’s, or the Catalonian trade offices in California.
199. Office of the Governor, Governor Schwarzenegger, Mexico President Fox Discuss
Pressing
Cross-Border
Issues
at
Historic,
May
25,
2006,
available
at
http://gov.ca.gov/index.php/press-release/816/.
200. Halberstam, supra note 198, at 1031.
201. Barry Weingast and others have argued that federalism preserves markets by devolving
power away from the central government and forcing subunits to compete against each other in their
policies. Qian, Yingyi & Barry R. Weingast, Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market
Incentives, 11(4) J. OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 83 (1997). Ideally, such decentralization and
deregulation will lead to growth. Id at 85-86. Weingast points to China and the United States as
cases of this occurring. See id. at 83-92.
202. Jonathan Rodden & Susan Rose-Ackerman. Does Federalism Preserve Markets?, 83 VA.
L. REV. 1521, 1524 (1997) (Arguing that a federal model of competition between states may
actually slow growth). For example, state politicians may not always act to maximize citizen
benefits. There may be more points of corruption in a federal system, state level inequality may
increase, and such a federal system may be unstable over the long term.
203. Donahue, supra note 174, at 73.
204. WHATLEY, supra note 199, at 12.
205. Id. at 18-19.
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agreement in July 2006 pledging environmental cooperation between
their two jurisdictions.206
Since the 1990s, at least 36 states have created ties with countries
around the world through the State Partnership Program of the National
Guard. For example, the Montana National Guard has provided infantry
training to Kyrgyzstan. As an outgrowth of this military exchange, the
Montana Nurses Association also sent representatives to train public
health personnel in Kyrgyzstan, and a Montana NGO has funded the
construction of a clinic for the developmentally disabled.207 In
December 2003, the President of Kyrgyzstan flew to Montana to meet
with Montana’s Governor and representatives from agriculture,
academics, the military, and other organizations.208
2. Laws and actions that protect and promote localities’ markets and
values in a manner that affects foreign relations
State and local actions often protect domestic markets or values.
These actions may be designed to specifically protect against foreigners.
Often the regulation of markets or values by localities has merely
incidental effects on foreigners. With the increased internationalization
of the areas of governance of localities, there is a greater chance for
these incidental conflicts to arise.
States have explicitly preferred local or U.S. companies against
foreign companies in procurement policies. Proponents of preferring
local or U.S. firms in procurement policies claim that the government
should use tax dollars to support domestic companies and spur the local
economy. Further, they argue domestic companies should not be
penalized for having to comply with tighter domestic labor and
environmental regulation.
Thirty-seven states voluntarily agreed in the early 1990s to cover
some of their state procurement under the WTO Agreement on

206. Press Release, Office of the Governor, Gov. Schwarzenegger, British Prime Minister Tony
Blair Sign Historic Agreement to Collaborate on Climate Change, Clean Energy, Jul. 31, 2006,
available at http://gov.ca.gov/index.php/press-release/2770/. It is unclear what the status of this
agreement is under Art. 1 Sec. 10 of the Constitution, which bars states from entering treaties with
foreign powers. U.S CONST. art I, § 10. Agreements of this type will likely increase in the coming
years, and their constitutional validity will come under increasing scrutiny. The California-UK
agreement is seemingly non-binding, and it appears unlikely that it will be challenged.
207. WHATLEY, supra note 199, at 16-17.
208. National Guard Bureau of International Affairs website, Montana National Guard State
Partnership
Program
in
Kyrgyzstan,
available
at
http://www.ngb.army.mil/ia/states/states/mt_kyrgyzstan.htm (last visited Dec. 27, 2006).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol40/iss4/3

44

Robinson: Citizens Not Subjects
ROBINSONFINAL.DOC

2007]

5/14/2007 12:48:46 PM

CITIZENS NOT SUBJECTS

691

Government Procurement (GPA).209 By so agreeing, these states allow
suppliers from the other country to have an equal opportunity to compete
for purchases in those states.210 Most states, however, still have some
preferences for in-state bidders and firms in their state procurement
policies.211 Several states have explicitly told the federal government
that they will decline a foreign company’s bid for procurement contracts.
In May 2004, the Governor of Maine rescinded his state’s commitment
to be bound by CAFTA’s procurement rules and stated that he will
review all future trade agreements on a case-by-case basis.212 In 2004,
over concerns about outsourcing abroad, at least 35 states introduced
legislation that would require that state contracts be performed inside the
United States.213 Lower courts have been split if such “Buy American”
laws are constitutional, and a case on this topic has not been decided in
the wake of Crosby and Garamendi.214 Several municipalities have also
prohibited the purchase of goods made with sweatshop labor and require
companies receiving municipal contracts to pay a living wage.215
Localities have taken steps to actively protect non-economic
interests as well. For example, several U.S. cities are members of
United Cities and Local Governments, a U.N. affiliated organization that
promotes cities’ interests at the U.N. United Cities has lobbied the UN
to create principles on decentralization and to give local governments

209. Office of the USTR, State Government Procurement and Trade Agreements, Apr. 1, 2004,
available
at
http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Fact_Sheets/2004/State_Government_Procurement_Trade_
Agreements.html.
210. Id.
211. See SELL2USGOV, State Procurement Preferences, Dec. 12, 2005, available at
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/sell2usgov/statelawsreg-en.asp (website maintained by Canadian
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade detailing procurement preferences for all 50
states).
212. Karen Imas, States Get Savvy on Trade Strategy, STATE NEWS, May 2005, at 24.
213. See National Conference of State Legislatures, 2004 Legislation Regulating or
Prohibiting Non-U.S. Citizens from State Contracts, June 29, 2004, available at
http://www.ncsl.org/standcomm/scecon/04LegisECON.htm.
214. See K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm’n, 381 A.2d
774, 789 (1977) (upholding constitutionality of state “Buy American” law on the grounds that it did
not “impermissibly interfere with the federal government’s conduct of foreign affairs” or impose
judgment on any foreign state); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 276 Cal. App. 2d 221,
229 (1969) (invalidating state “Buy American” law as conflicting with federal trade policies).
215. San Francisco, Cleveland, and a number of other cities have laws banning the
procurement of products made in sweatshops. See, Pittsburgh Joins City Fight Against Sweatshops,
U.S. NEWSWIRE, Sept. 23, 1997 (discussing Pittsburgh sweatshop ordinance); Linda Himelstein,
Going Beyond City Limits? Municipalities Are Exercising Their Clout on Social Issues - And
Business Is Balking, BUS. WK., July 7, 1997, at 98 (noting passage of San Francisco ordinance).
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special observer status at the U.N.216 These recommendations are based
on the assumption that localities have a unique perspective about and
role in governing that needs to be protected and promoted at an
international level.
With the pervasive effects of globalization, many localities’ actions
that protect and promote domestic markets and values have an incidental
effect on foreign relations.
Sometimes these cases also have
protectionist or xenophobic undertones, but in all of them traditional
state and local interests are also being pursued.
Such incidental effects have been challenged in U.S. court cases.
For example, in 2004 in the complaint to Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep,
Inc. et al. v. Witherspoon217 several major automakers including Ford
and General Motors sued the California Air Resources Board. They
argued that the Clean Air Act and federal fuel economy laws preempted
the California’s regulation of carbon dioxide. They also claimed,
however, that the federal foreign affairs power and the dormant foreign
interstate commerce clause preempted the state regulations. The
petitioner’s brief submitted that California’s regulation of carbon dioxide
“. . . interferes with the U.S. speaking with one voice on matters of
global climate change, and it diminishes the President’s leverage in
negotiating multilateral commitments to reduce greenhouse gases.”218
Local regulations that have an incidental impact on foreign
commerce have also been challenged under Chapter Eleven of NAFTA.
In December 2003, Glamis Gold Ltd, a Canadian mining company, filed
a complaint under Chapter Eleven challenging state regulations that
blocked their development of a California mine site.219 The regulations
216. United Cities and Local Governments, Stronger partnership with local governments
central
to
reforming
the
UN,
available
at
http://www.citieslocalgovernments.org/uclg/index.asp?pag=template.asp&L=EN&ID=282 (last visited Dec. 27,
2006).
217. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Central Valley ChryslerJeep, Inc., et. al. v. Witherspoon, Case No. 1:04-cv-06663-REC-LJO (E.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2005).
218. Id. at 95. The Brief continues:
The President’s bargaining power is reduced even further if other states adopt
California’s fuel economy standards. Far from attempting to conform their actions to the
position of the national government, California officials, including the Secretary of the
California Environmental Protection Agency and CARB officials beneath him, are
actively campaigning for adoption of CARB’s regulation by at least one foreign
government (Canada), to make federal fuel economy policy irrelevant or much less
important in the global automobile industry.
Id.
219. Glamis Gold, LTD., Notice of Arbitration under the Arbitration Rules of the United
Nations Commission on International Trade and the North American Free Trade Agreement:
Glamis Gold Ltd.,Claimant/Investor, and The Government of the United States of America,
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required backfilling the mine site, which would make the project
financially infeasible.220 The regulations had general applicability, but
were implemented because of specific concerns about environmental and
cultural damage that the Glamis Gold mine site might cause.221 The
arbitration is ongoing.
In 2005 in Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, a Chapter
Eleven Tribunal rejected the claim of a Canadian company that a
California Executive Order banning the use of the gasoline additive
MTBE, which the company manufactured, violated NAFTA.222 It
ordered the company to pay the costs of litigation for the United
States.223
In March 2004, Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., a
Canadian company in the tobacco industry operating in the United
States, lodged a complaint under Chapter Eleven.224 Under an
agreement between the major cigarette makers and forty-six states, the
states agreed to not pursue litigation against tobacco companies in
exchange for a multi-billion dollar settlement.225
The tobacco
companies had to raise prices to fund the settlement.226 They feared,
however, that smaller companies who had not been sued, and so were
not part of the settlement, would thereby gain an unfair market
advantage.227 In response, the states established a series of incentives to
attract non-party tobacco companies to join the agreement as well as
imposed additional regulations if they did not join the agreement.228
Grand River Enterprises Six Nations challenged these state acts under
NAFTA.229 The litigation is ongoing.230
Respondent/Party,
Dec.
9,
2003,
available
at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/27320.pdf.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. U.S. Dept. of State, Methanex v. United States of America Summary, available at
http://www.state.gov/s/l/c5818.htm (last visited Dec. 28, 2006) (the claimed violations were under
Article 1110 (a claim of expropriation), Article 1105 (denying fair and equitable treatment in
accordance with international law), and Article 1102 (discriminatory treatment against foreign
investors)).
223. Id.
224. Grand River, et al., Notice of Arbitration under the Arbitration Rules of the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law and The North American Free Trade Agreement:
Between Grand River Enterprises Six nations, Ltd., et al. and the Government of the United States,
Mar. 10, 2004, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/30961.pdf.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
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The WTO has also been a site of international debate around state
and local policies that affect foreign commerce. In 2005, the WTO
Appellate Body found that U.S. federal cotton subsidies violated
provisions of GATT and the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (SCM).231 State and local subsidies have also
come under scrutiny though. In a trade dispute between the European
Union and the United States over their respective support of Airbus and
Boeing, each brought a complaint against the other in the WTO over
government subsidies.232 In its original complaint, filed in October
2004, the European Union claimed that the United States was not in
compliance with the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures as well as provisions of GATT. The complaint not only
argued that different forms of federal subsidies violated these
agreements, but also argued that tax and incentive packages given by
Kansas, Washington State, and the city of Chicago violated these
agreements.233 According to the EU, the Washington state package to
Boeing was worth $7 billion.234 There is currently a WTO panel
reviewing these complaints.235 Localities have long given subsidies to
attract corporations, rejuvenate depressed communities, and retain
businesses that are part of their cultural heritage. Such subsidies are
likely to come under increasing scrutiny from the WTO.
The unsuccessful implementation or inadequacy of state or local
laws and regulations can also have an impact on commerce with foreign
countries. For example, states are responsible for the tracking of
animals and any diseases they might have. In 2004, an outbreak of mad
cow disease in Washington cost the U.S. $400 million in lost sales to
Japan alone.236 In this way, the effectiveness of one state’s regulation of

230. U.S. Dept. of State, Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., et. al. v. United States of
America Summary, available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/c11935.htm (last visited Dec. 28, 2006).
231. WTO, Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS267, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds267_e.htm (last visited Dec. 28,
2006).
232. BBC, U.S. takes Airbus dispute to WTO, BBC NEWS, Oct. 6, 2004, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3720710.stm.
233. United States - Measures Affecting Trade In Large Civil Aircraft: Request for
Consultations by the European Communities, G/SCM/D63/1, Oct. 12, 2004.
234. European Union News Releases, EU Resumes WTO Case Against Boeing, May 31, 2005,
available at http://www.eurunion.org/News/press/2005/2005056.htm.
235. WTO, Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS317, United States - Measures Affecting Trade In
Large Civil Aircraft, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds317_e.htm
(last visited Dec. 28, 2006).
236. Gene Rose, State Legislatures’ Top 10: Here’s a Sample of the Key Policy Issues that
Promise to Cross State Borders and Test Political Wills, STATE LEGISLATURES, Jan. 2005, at 10.
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animal disease can affect the ability of all states to access international
markets for their animal products. This may add fuel to the argument to
federalize such regulations.
Localities’ laws also affirm local values that may be contrary to the
values of other countries. The “culture wars” that take place between
different constituencies in the United States are often joined by foreign
voices who feel that certain policies offend universal rights, values, or
sensibilities. For example, until the Supreme Court’s decision in Roper
v. Simmons, twenty states continued to allow for the execution of
juveniles despite near universal international condemnation of juvenile
executions.237 Opposition to the death penalty in general is widespread
in much of the world, and the continued widespread use of the death
penalty in the United States has at times become a diplomatic strain,
especially with countries in Europe. The European Union maintains an
official website detailing EU member state action on the U.S. death
penalty. European Union members angered by executions taking place
in the United States have written numerous open letters to state
governors, declarations of condemnation, and amicus briefs.238 As
already noted, the ICJ in Avena held that 54 Mexican nationals on state
death rows had their consular rights violated under the Vienna
Convention for Consular Relations.239
Gay marriage and civil unions provide another sight for potential
conflicts of values on the international stage. Most states have laws
which prohibit marriage between same-sex couples, and many have
passed constitutional amendments barring same-sex marriage.240
Vermont, Connecticut, and New Jersey allow civil unions between
same-sex couples.241 In 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled
that outlawing same-sex marriages was unconstitutional under the
Massachusetts constitution.242 Canada, Spain, the Netherlands, and

237. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005).
238. See generally, European Union, EU & Action on the Death Penalty (section on “Action
on
US
Death
Row
Cases”)
available
at,
http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/DeathPenalty/deathpenhome.htm#ActiononUSDeathRowCases
(last visited Dec. 28, 2006).
239. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. Unites States of
America), 43 I.L.M. 581 (2004).
240. See Lambda Legal, Background: State Laws and Proposed Amendments to State
Constitutions
to
Deny
Civil
Rights
to
Same-Sex
Couples,
available
at
http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/news/fact.html?record=1530 (last visited Dec. 28, 2006).
241. Gay Marriage Around the Globe, BBC NEWS, Dec. 22, 2005, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4081999.stm [hereinafter Gay Marriage].
242. Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 440 Mass. 309 (2003).
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Belgium all have nation-wide same-sex marriage.243 Canada allows
same-sex foreign nationals to marry.244 Several other countries such as
Denmark and Germany offer similar although not always equal benefits
to same-sex couples as married couples (i.e. civil unions).245
Recognition of same-sex marriages and civil unions consummated
abroad is done on a state by state basis in the United States. States in the
U.S. that do not recognize same-sex marriage or civil unions may upset
countries that allow such unions if same-sex couples from their country
seek temporary residency in these states and want their marriages or
civil unions recognized. Similarly, a same-sex couple from Vermont
who is in a civil union may ask Vermont to advocate that their union be
recognized in another country in which they are temporarily residing that
does not currently recognize same-sex unions.
Differing views about what constitutes human life also may embroil
states in a global debate about values. In November 2004, in reaction to
federal limitations on National Institutes of Health (NIH) funding for
certain types of stem-cell research, California voters passed a $3 billion
initiative to finance stem-cell research.246 This makes California’s stemcell research budget on par with countries such as Sweden and
Singapore which have made such research a priority.247 Several other
states have either budgeted money or proposed money for stem-cell
research as well.248 Meanwhile, Arkansas, Iowa, Michigan, North
Dakota, and South Dakota all prohibit cloning of embryos for the
purpose of research or reproduction.249 The issues surrounding cloning
and stem-cell research all have the potential to insult the moral
sensibilities of the citizens and governments of foreign countries and
become diplomatic issues in the future.
States’ differing stances on illegal immigrants directly affect
relations with foreign citizens and their countries. States have taken
different positions on whether illegal immigrants will be eligible for
non-emergency health care, certain labor rights, in-state college tuition
rates, legal services, voting, identification cards, and other public
benefits. Some states have also specifically trained state officials to
243. Gay Marriage, supra note 247.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Silla Brush, The Stem Cell Race, STATE LEGISLATURES, Apr. 2005, at 24-25.
247. Id.
248. New Jersey has approved money for stem cell research. New York, Illinois, Wisconsin,
Maryland, and Connecticut all have proposed legislation that proposes money for stem cell research.
Id. at 26.
249. Id.
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arrest illegal immigrants. In others, state officials make no coordinated
effort to track or arrest illegal immigrants.250 Such actions and antiimmigrant sentiment fueled by local politicians can offend foreign
governments and complicate U.S. foreign relations.
Even something as seemingly innocuous as the choice of a textbook
by a school board can have far reaching international implications. In
April of 2005, thousands of protesters marched in Chinese cities angered
by the Japanese government’s approval of textbooks that were perceived
by many in China as glossing over the atrocities Japan committed in
China during World War II.251 Although this was a Japanese national
government decision made in the context of deep historical animosity
between the two nations, in the United States this decision would be
made on the state and local level.
The traditional domains of localities are becoming of greater
international concern. Many of these areas of regulation are at the heart
of state and local governance. Local decisions in these areas allow
citizens to more fully shape their lives, create a nation-wide system of
policy experimentation, and provide a check on federal and international
power.
The internationalization of trade, human rights, and
environmental commitments means, however, that many of these core
functions of localities are coming under new scrutiny and threat. These
state and local policies could be struck down by U.S. courts under the
dormant foreign relations clause, heightened legislative or executive
preemption (depending on what steps the executive or legislative
branches have taken to occupy the field), or even the dormant foreign
commerce clause. Such judicial intervention could severely and, quite
possibly, unnecessarily constrain the ability of localities to express core
values in the name of a united “one voice” in foreign policy.
3. Laws and actions that judge other countries’ behavior
Localities’ actions that judge other countries’ behavior could be
defined as a sub-category of protecting or promoting localities’ values
(category two). These actions, however, are dealt with in a separate
category here because these judgments are targeted at particular policies
250. Mark Mathews, Immigration Bedevils Lawmakers, STATELINE, Sept. 2, 2005, available at
http://www.stateline.org/live/ViewPage.action?siteNodeId=136&languageId=1&contentId=51980;
National Conference of State Legislatures, 2006 State Legislation Related to Immigration: Enacted,
Vetoed,
and
Pending
Gubernatorial
Action,
June
7,
2006,
available
at
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/immig/06ImmigEnactedLegis.htm.
251. BBC, China Rejects Call for an Apology, BBC NEWS, Apr. 17, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4453055.stm.
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of specific countries. They have also garnered special judicial scrutiny.
Localities may judge other countries’ behavior explicitly through
resolutions or legislation. States may also delegate that judgment to the
state executive or judiciary. These judgments of foreign countries can
sometimes be just rhetorical expressions in the case of state resolutions,
have real economic or judicial force behind them as in the case of
divestment campaigns or lawsuits, or be symbolic such as when cities
have used their sister-city ties to pursue human rights objectives.252
These judgments may be purely expressive, an ethical attempt to ensure
state resources are not complicit in the judged behavior, or an attempt to
influence behavior by other countries.
State legislatures have used resolutions as a way to condemn the
actions of other countries on such diverse issues as Apartheid in South
Africa, genocide in Sudan,253 or the arrest and show trials of Jews in
Iran.254 These resolutions may bring media attention to a specific issue
and are circulated to the state’s congressional delegation. They also
provide tangible goals for local constituencies to work towards, which
helps build momentum for broader movements. Although these state
resolutions may undermine the U.S.’s one voice in foreign relations,
they are likely protected by the First Amendment.255
States have also used their economic power to condemn human
rights abuses overseas. The South African divestment campaign spread
during the 1980s as many localities felt Reagan’s policy of “constructive
engagement” and “quiet diplomacy” towards South Africa was not a
forceful enough response to apartheid.256 During the South Africa
divestment campaign, 37 states adopted some form of sanctions against
the government of South Africa.257 These sanctions usually involved
252. FRY, supra note 201, at 84 (discussing efforts by various U.S. cities to promote
international human rights); HOBBS, supra note 203, at 6 (noting that Mayor Dinkins of New York
City traveled to South Africa during Apartheid to express his support for continued sanctions).
253. See Assem. Res. 209, 211th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2004); H. J. Res. 56, 94th Gen. Assem.,
Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2005); H. Con. Res. 143, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2005); S. 608, 116th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (S.C. 2005); H. Con. Res. 143, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2005); S. Res. 112, 2005 Leg., Reg.
Sess., (Haw. 2005); S. Con. Res. 205, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess., (Haw. 2004).
254. Assem. J. Res. 64, 2000 Leg., Reg. Sess., (Cal. 2000).
255. However, the precedent here is not clear. Individual state legislators certainly enjoy full,
if not heightened, first amendment protection (see Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966)), but a state
assembly could potentially be enjoined from passing a resolution that disrupted the U.S.’s ability to
conduct foreign relations. The Court in Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Giannoulias, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13341, remarks in dicta that Garamendi and Zschernig do not seem to prohibit state
resolutions which contradicts U.S. foreign policy. Id. at 38. However, the Court is only speaking in
dicta and this statement is not otherwise substantiated.
256. HOBBS, supra note 203, at 29.
257. See PETER DESIMONE & WILLIAM F. MOSES, A GUIDE TO AMERICAN STATE AND LOCAL
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different restrictions on the ability of the state pension plan to invest in
companies that did business in South Africa. Additionally, at least 105
cities and 32 counties maintained some type of restriction on their
banking, investment, and procurement practices with South Africa.258
In 1996, Massachusetts adopted an act that restricted the state’s
procurement of goods or services from companies that did business in
Burma.259 Apple Computer along with other companies reportedly
terminated their Burma operations in response to the Massachusetts
Burma statute.260 In 2000, in Crosby the Supreme Court ruled that this
selective purchasing law was preempted by federal legislation that
created a national sanctions regime towards Burma.261 Since Crosby
there has been debate about how articulated a national policy must be
toward another country before it preempts state action toward that
country. Further, it is unclear what types of state action besides selective
procurement policies could be preempted.262
Despite the ambiguity surrounding Crosby, cities and states
continue to use their clout as investors to express their scorn for the
policies of certain governments as well as attempt to promote their view
of a more just world. For example, the MacBride Principles provide a
corporate code of conduct for doing business in Northern Ireland for
multinationals to ensure nondiscrimination on the basis of religion.263 At
least 16 states have passed MacBride Principles legislation that directs
their pension funds to only invest in companies in compliance with these
principles if they are active in Northern Ireland.264
Other restrictions on pension funds exist as well. Connecticut, for
example, restricts its pension fund from investing in companies that are
LAWS ON SOUTH AFRICA 19-43 (1993).
258. Id. at 1, 47-138 (city ordinances), 141-63 (county ordinances).
259. 1996 Mass. Acts 239, ch. 130 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 7 § 22G-M,
40F.5(1997)) (cited in Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 367 (2000).).
260. See Frank Phillips, Apple Cites Mass. Law in Burma Decision, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 4,
1996, at B6 (stating “company would end its operations in Burma because of the Massachusetts
law”); See also, Crosby, 530 U.S. at 370 (noting that three plaintiff member companies had
withdrawn from Burma after passage of Massachusetts law).
261. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 388.
262. Andrea Sendlenski, Note: Taking Our Money and Going Home: State Divestment Policy
and the Foreign Affairs, Foreign Commerce, and Supremacy Clauses, 24 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.
REV. 317 (2001) (arguing state divestment statutes with the intent to effect foreign affairs violate the
Foreign Affairs, Foreign Commerce, and Supremacy Clauses)
263. Father Sean McManus, The Macbride Principles, Dec. 1997, available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/links/macbride.html.
264. Id. These states include Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Texas, and Vermont. Id.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2007

53

Akron Law Review, Vol. 40 [2007], Iss. 4, Art. 3
ROBINSONFINAL.DOC

700

5/14/2007 12:48:46 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[40:647

doing business in Iran in a manner that is contrary to U.S. foreign policy
interests there.265 The State of Arizona requires its state treasurer to
report twice a year on the global security risks of state investments.266
This report must include a list of companies held in the treasurer’s
portfolio who have business activities in countries that the federal
government has listed as supporting terrorism.267 Vermont requires its
treasurer to cast proxy votes in the companies it holds stock in to
promote human rights and transparency in relation to Burma.268 Other
state and local governments have adopted human-rights based sanctions
against Indonesia, Nigeria, Cuba, and countries engaging in religious
persecution.269
In 2004, the New York State Senate blocked the UN’s proposed
renovation of its New York City headquarters.270 Various Senators cited
the oil for food scandal, anti-Semitism in the organization, and the
nonpayment of parking tickets by visiting diplomats as part of their
reasons for blocking the proposed renovation.271 In this case, it was not
a specific country, but a specific international organization that was
targeted for a state’s scorn.
In some states, judgment of other countries’ behavior or policies is
delegated to officials of the state executive. In California, for example,
the State Treasurer evaluates the political stability in emerging equity
markets using such factors as the country’s human rights and civil
liberties record before it invests CALPERS, the largest state pension
fund in the country.272 The treasurer lists which emerging markets it will
invest in each year. This list of the $168 billion pension plan does not
go unnoticed by investors or government officials abroad.273 In
265. STATE OF CONNECTICUT RETIREMENT PLANS & TRUST FUNDS, INVESTMENT POLICY
STATEMENT, Mar. 13, 2002, at 21, available at http://www.state.ct.us/ott/pensiondocs/IPS.pdf.
266. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-319 (2007).
267. Id.
268. H.B. 34, 65th Leg., Biennel Sess., (Vt. 1999).
269. Organization
for
International
Investment,
Current
Issues,
http://www.ofii.org/issues/sanction.cfm (last visited Dec. 28, 2006) (listing state and municipal
sanctions from the 1990’s); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 215.471 (West 2001) (restricting the investment of
Florida’s funds in Cuba).
270. Press Release, News From the Senate Republican Majority, Senate Will Not Take Up
United
Nations
Bill
Next
Week
(Dec.
2,
2004),
http://www.senate.state.ny.us/pressreleases.nsf/2e0e86fa9105ed5a85256ec30061c0be/109e9077be7
1eb7985256f5e006c703b?OpenDocument.
271. Id.
272. CALIFORNIA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM, STATEMENT OF INVESTMENT
POLICY FOR PERMISSIBLE EQUITY FOR EMERGING EQUITY MARKETS, Oct. 17, 2005, at 2, available
at https://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/investments/policies/equity/permissible-country.pdf.
273. See Nuntawun Polkuamdee, Thailand back in US fund’s good books, BANGKOK POST,
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Connecticut, the state treasurer is directed to consider environmental and
social implications of its investments, which inevitably involves at least
implicitly judging the social situations in other countries.274 State
Treasurers in California, New York, and Connecticut have also worked
to address companies’ contributions to sweatshop labor and global
warming.275 These actions often attempt to regulate companies’
behavior abroad because the countries in which they are doing business
are unable or unwilling to do so themselves.
In 2005, Illinois, New Jersey, and Oregon all passed legislation to
divest their pension plans from companies because of their business in
Sudan, where there are ongoing atrocities being committed in Darfur.276
As of April 2007, seven more states had joined these three in passing
divestment legislation.277 Several cities and counties have also divested
their funds from companies that do business in Sudan.278
In August of 2006, the National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC) and
several municipal pension funds in Illinois brought suit against the
Illinois Act to End Atrocities and Terrorism in the Sudan [the Illinois
Sudan Act].279 The Illinois Sudan Act amended the Deposit of State
Moneys Act to bar the state from depositing state funds in a financial
institution unless it annually certifies that it does not borrow money to a
“forbidden entity” (i.e. almost any company that does business in or with
Sudan). The Illinois Sudan Act also prevented any pension fund created
under the Illinois Pension Code (which includes many municipal
pension funds) from investing in a “forbidden entity.”280 The Act’s
definition of forbidden entity was one of the broadest of any of the
states’ Sudan divestment legislation. Further, the Illinois Sudan Act
Apr. 20, 2005.
274. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 3-13d (West 2006).
275. Tracy Rembert, CSR in the Cross-Hairs, BUSINESS ETHICS ONLINE, Spring 2005,
available at http://www.business-ethics.com/current_issue/spring_2005_csr_crosshairs.html.
276. S.B. 23. 94th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2005); S.B. 2145, 211 Leg., Second Sess. (N.J.
2004); S.B. 1089, 73rd Leg., Reg. Sess., (Or. 2005).
277. See Assem. B. 2941, 2005-2006 Leg., Reg. Sess., (Cal. 2006), H.B. 5632, 2006 Leg., Feb.
Sess., (Conn. 2006); S. Paper 675,122nd Leg., Reg. Sess., (Me. 2005) See generally, Sudan
Divestment Taskforce, http://www.sudandivestment.org/home.asp (last visited May 5, 2007).
278. Id.
279. Elizabeth Kelleher, U.S. Trade Group Files Suit over Illinois Sanctions on Sudan, U.S.
Dept.
of
State
News
from
Washington,
Aug.
7
2006,
available
at
http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfileenglish&y=2006&m=August&x=20060807174000berehellek0.6285974; Complaint for Declaratory
and Injunctive Relief, Nat’l Foreign Trade Counsel v. Giannoulias, No. 06C4251 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7,
2006),
available
at
http://www.nftc.org/default/sudan%20lawsuit/NFCT%20v.%20Topinka%20complaint.pdf.
280. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Giannoulias, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13341, at 3-9.
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went beyond most divestment legislation in barring the state from
depositing money in financial institutions that gave loans to Sudaninvolved companies.
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois enjoined
enforcement of the Illinois Sudan Act in a February 2007 decision. It
found unconstitutional both the amendments to the Deposit to the States
Money Act and the Illinois Pension Code.281 The District Court’s
reasoning though could potentially be used to uphold other states’
divestment legislation, or a revised Illinois statute.
The District Court first asked if the Illinois Sudan Act was barred
by the Supremacy Clause. The Court found that U.S. relations with
Sudan were governed by a 1997 Executive Order, the 2000 Trade
Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act, the 2002 Sudan Peace
Act, the 2004 Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act, and the 2006 Darfur
Peace and Accountability Act.282 Citing Hines v. Davidowitz, Zschernig,
and a first circuit opinion, the Court argued that when the U.S.
government acts in an area of foreign relations there is a strong
presumption it intends to occupy the field. The District Court found that
the Illinois Sudan Act’s amendment of the Deposit of State Moneys Act,
like the Massachusetts’ legislation at issue in Crosby, “attempt[s] to
influence foreign policy directly by encouraging business entities not to
do business with a foreign country; if the entities decide not to do so,
they lose their ability to do business with the state.”283 This amendment
is in conflict with U.S. foreign policy because the Illinois Sudan Act
lacks flexibility (the president cannot suspend the Illinois legislation in
the national interest); it applies to areas of Sudan not covered under
federal sanctions (i.e. Southern Sudan); and it extends to foreign entities
while the federal legislation only regulates U.S. entities.284
Therefore, the District Court held the amendments to the Deposit of
State Moneys Act violated the supremacy clause because it pressured
banks and corporations to cut ties with Sudan and, thereby, came in
conflict with U.S. policy towards Sudan. The amendments to the
Pension code did not violate the Supremacy Clause though because no
evidence was presented that suggested pensions’ divestment from
companies that do business in Sudan would likely affect whether these
companies decided to stay in Sudan.285 In other words, the Court said
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

Giannoulias, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
Id. at 9-14.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 28-30.
Id. at 30-31.
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that pressuring banks to limit who they lent to will likely have an effect
on banks and corporations so this action is preempted by federal policy,
but since divestment will likely have little effect it is not preempted.
The Court followed a similar reasoning when examining whether
the Illinois Sudan Act was barred by the Foreign Affairs Power. Citing
Zschernig and Garamendi, the District Court held that the amendments
to the Deposit of State Moneys Act violated the Foreign Affairs Power
because it applied immediate pressure on banks and corporations to
leave Sudan. Such action had more than “an incidental or indirect effect
in foreign countries.”286 In contrast, the evidence divestment would have
an effect on companies’ behavior, and thus foreign policy, was only
speculative. As a result, the Court found that the amendments to the
Pension code withstood scrutiny by the Foreign Affairs Power.287
Finally, the District Court examined whether the Illinois Sudan Act
violated the Foreign Commerce Clause. It found that both components
of the Illinois Sudan Act effected foreign commerce since the purpose of
the act was to limit trade with Sudan.288 The Court noted that it was
unclear if there was a market-participant exception for states under the
foreign commerce clause as there is under the ordinary commerce
clause.289 This question, however, was not reached. The amendments to
the Deposit of State Moneys Act had already been found to violate the
Supremacy Clause and Foreign Affairs Power. The amendments to the
Pension code could not qualify for the market-participant exception
because the Pension code covered both state and municipal pensions.
The state could only potentially act as a market participant when it
regulated its own pension funds. However, when it regulated municipal
pension funds – which are administered and contributed to locally – it
was acting as a regulator and not a market-participant. Since the
language of the Illinois Sudan Act did not distinguish between its
regulation of state and municipal pensions the Court could not just strike
out the offending language that regulates municipal pensions.290 Instead,
the District Court found the whole provision barred by the Foreign
Commerce Clause.
The District Court’s opinion suggests that state divestment
legislation, like that in Illinois, would be constitutional if it does not
286. Id. at 40, quoting Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 52 (1st Cir. 1999),
citing Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947)).
287. Giannoulias, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at 43-44.
288. Id. at 46-47.
289. Id. at 50-51.
290. Id. at 53-56.
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mandate that governmental sub-units also divest. Of course, a future
court would still need to determine whether a state was acting as a
market participant when it divests.
The Illinois District Court’s line of reasoning leaves the
constitutionality of divestment on unstable ground. This is particularly
problematic since NFTC has announced it may challenge other state
divestment laws and any revised Illinois Sudan Act.291 Why does
barring a state from investing its money in a bank that makes loans to
companies that do business in Sudan have more impact than divesting
state funds from companies that do business in Sudan? Divestment
often involves larger amounts of money. Both actions bring bad
publicity to companies who are invested in Sudan applying pressure on
them to leave. If companies did start leaving Sudan because of states
divesting would this then mean divestment had an impact on foreign
affairs and so would be struck down? Divestment would then only be
held unconstitutional if it was successful at achieving its goal.
The Illinois Sudan Act required the state to divest from many
companies and financial institutions with only an incidental relation to
Sudan. By casting such a wide net, the Illinois legislation may have
unnecessarily risked the financial health of Illinois pension plans. The
answer to this problem, however, is not for courts to dictate to states that
they cannot control whether their money is invested in companies that
support genocidal regimes. Instead, if this legislation is overly broad, a
legislative remedy is more appropriate. Legislators do not want to
unnecessarily jeopardize the returns of the state pension plans. If Illinois
does not amend their divestment legislation, it may be because the state
genuinely wishes to divest from companies that have any relation to
Sudan, even if this relation is more incidental than direct.
Although the Illinois divestment legislation may seem heavyhanded, the Sudan divestment strategies of other localities have been
remarkably savvy. With the aid of the Internet, localities and groups that
have mobilized around divestment can relatively quickly identify many
of the companies who are most active in supporting the government of
Sudan.292 Localities can then direct their fund managers to divest from

291. Kelleher, supra note 285; Foreign trade group against Sudan legislation, PENSIONS &
INVESTMENTS,
April
9,
2007,
available
at
http://www.pionline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070409/DAILY/70409005.
292. See generally, Sudan Divestment Taskforce, supra note 278; ALLARD K. LOWENSTEIN
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, AN ANALYSIS OF SELECT COMPANIES’ OPERATIONS IN
SUDAN:
A
RESOURCE
FOR
DIVESTMENT
(2005),
available
at
http://acir.yale.edu/YaleLowensteinSudanReport.pdf.
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these companies.
Like in Crosby, Congress has not expressly acted to affirm the
Illinois state divestment legislation just as it did not expressly act to
affirm Massachusetts’s procurement policy. In both cases, Congress,
however, passed later stages of its sanctions regime, knowing of the state
actions and did not expressly preempt such activity.
The House version of the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act
contained a provision affirming the legality of state divestment
legislation.293 This provision, however, was later taken out of the Senate
version in committee.294 The revised version was passed in September
of 2006.295 Meanwhile, SB 831 was introduced in the Senate in March
2007. This bill would declare that it is the sense of Congress that
divestment by states and other governmental entities is constitutional
and does not violate the Supremacy Clause, the Foreign Affairs Power,
or the Foreign Commerce Clause.296 Although Congress has not yet
explicitly endorsed the legality of localities’ divestment action, it is
clearly aware of localities’ divestment activity and has not explicitly
preempted it.
It should not be the role of the courts to interfere with the foreign
policy of localities and the federal government when no explicit conflict
has arisen between these policies. As of May 2007, there were eight cosponsors of SB 831.297 Does this mean Congress supports localities’
divestment? What of the Senate’s removal of the provision of the Darfur
Peace and Accountability Act that would have affirmed the legality of
divestment legislation? Courts would be engaging in a guessing game at
this point if they were to strike down the Illinois divestment legislation
claiming it interfered with the country’s foreign policy. This is
dangerous to America’s foreign policy and unnecessarily undermines the
democracy and federalism interests of localities and the citizens they
represent. If actions, like divestment, require federal affirmation before
they are considered constitutional, the states will rarely act on foreign
policy issues. Congress is unlikely to affirm state action like divestment
until several states have divested, but most states are unlikely to divest if
that action is considered unconstitutional until federal approval is given.

293. DarfurScores.org,
Darfur
Legislation,
http://www.darfurscores.org/darfurlegislation#hr6140 (last visited Dec. 30, 2006).
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. S. 831, 110th Cong. (2007).
297. S. 831: Sudan divestment Authorization Act of 2007, GOVTRACK.US, available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s110-831 (accessed May 6, 2007).
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The state judicial system also either explicitly or implicitly judges
foreign countries. For example, in Zschernig the state of Oregon
allowed property to escheat to a foreigner only if the foreigner’s country
gave a reciprocal right to Americans.298 Both the actual legislation and
the judicial opinions allowed for a judgment of Communist countries.299
This was found to be too controversial during the Cold War by the
Supreme Court and was struck down.300
In John Doe, et. al. v. Unocal Corp., the Superior Court of
California ruled that Unocal, a California based oil and gas company,
could be tried for its involvement in abuses against Burmese villagers
during its construction of a pipeline in that country.301 Under pressure
from the upcoming state trial and a possible unfavorable decision by an
en banc 9th Circuit decision in an ATCA case being heard on the same
set of facts, Unocal settled with the Burmese villagers.302 The decision
by the state court that Burma was not an adequate forum for the suit was
a judgment of the competency and independence of Burmese courts.
The trial of the claims against Unocal would have not only judged the
company’s actions, but implicitly judged the actions of the Burmese
government as well (as many of the abuses were committed by Burmese
military hired by Unocal as security).303
In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004), the Supreme
Court found that claims could be made by foreign citizens in U.S. courts
for private claims under federal common law, but they cannot be claims
“for violations of any international norm with less definite content and
acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms
familiar when 1350 [the ATCA] was enacted.”304 Alvarez may be read
to create a federal common law that preempts state common law claims

298. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S 429, 430 n.1 (1968).
299. Id. at 440.
300. Id. at 435.
301. 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2001). The original complaint made claims of wrongful death,
battery, false imprisonment, assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction
of emotional distress, negligence per se, conversion, negligent hiring, negligent supervision,
violation of Business and Professions Code Section 17200, injunctive and declaratory relief,
violation of California Constitution Art. 1 Sec. 6 [outlawing slavery], and unjust enrichment. Id. at
943-44. Defendants eventually received summary judgment on the intentional tort and negligence
causes of action as to direct liability, but were to go to trial on issues of vicarious liability. Id.
302. EarthRights International, Final Settlement Reached in Doe v. Unocal, Mar. 21, 2005,
http://www.earthrights.org/legalfeature/final_settlement_reached_in_doe_v._unocal.html;
EarthRights
International,
Doe
v.
Unocal
Case
History,
Jan.
30,
2006,
http://www.earthrights.org/site_blurbs/doe_v._unocal_case_history.html.
303. Id.
304. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004).
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that involve abuses in foreign countries such as in the state Unocal case.
It is unclear what role state courts will have in the future of hearing
claims concerning human rights abuses abroad since state courts do not
have the same standards for hearing these cases as federal courts do
under the ATCA.
4. Laws and actions that influence the nation’s foreign policy
Localities’ actions often attempt to influence national foreign
policy. Some of these actions merely help reinforce and support
preexisting federal foreign policy. The most prominent example of this
is localities’ support of the U.S. military in their operations abroad.305
However, localities’ actions may also be in protest to U.S. foreign
policy or designed to change it. The Central American sanctuary
movement grew out of dissatisfaction with the U.S.’s policy towards
Central America in the 1980’s and the belief that refugees from El
Salvador and Guatemala were politically persecuted despite U.S. support
for these regimes. In all, “more than 20 cities and two states declared
themselves sanctuaries for Central American refugees.”306 During this
same period, 87 cities created sister city type relationships with
communities in Nicaragua, in part to show solidarity against U.S. policy
there.307
U.S. sanctions on Cuba have similarly been a target of state and
local action both on political and economic grounds. The Illinois and
Texas state legislatures have passed resolutions in support of normal
relations between the U.S. and Cuba.308 Some cities in the United States
have established “Sister City” type relations with Cuban cities to express
their support for more normal relations between the United States and
Cuba.309 After lobbying by agricultural interests, Illinois Governor Ryan
305. At least twenty-six state governors have made trips to Southwest Asia to meet with
National Guard troops from their states as well as active duty military since military operations
began in Afghanistan and Iraq. Donna Miles, Governors Praise Troops Following Middle East
Visit,
AMERICAN
FORCES
PRESS
SERVICE,
Apr.
19,
2006,
available
at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2006/20060419_4868.html. States have also created specific
benefits and exemptions to help support those in the military in their states while the conflicts in
Afghanistan and Iraq are ongoing. For example, New York passed a “Patriot Plan” to help support
active duty troops while there are active military operations in Iraq. Press Release of Gov. George
E. Pataki, Governor Visits Families of Deployed 105th Military Police Company (Mar. 24, 2003)
available at http://www.state.ny.us/governor/press/03/march24_03.htm.
306. HOBBS, supra note 203, at 36-37.
307. Id. at 34.
308. On First Reading Some States Want to Open Cuba’s Closed Doors, STATE
LEGISLATURES, Dec. 2001.
309. These cities include Mobile, Pittsburgh, and Milwaukee. The Center for International
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led a mission to Cuba in 1999 to promote trade and deliver aid.310
During the trip he met with Cuban President Fidel Castro.311 Shortly
after returning he stated, “My hope is there will be other state
delegations that go, and hopefully we’ll lift this embargo.”312 In 2002,
Havana hosted governors and other representatives from seven states at a
Food and Agribusiness Exhibition.313
Over one hundred cities passed resolutions calling for the end of the
Iraq War.314 In early 2005 during the annual town hall day in Vermont,
49 cities and towns passed a resolution that asked the state legislature to
investigate what the impact of National Guard deployments to Iraq are
having on the state.315 Several cities across the country have passed
resolutions calling on their states to withdraw their National Guard
troops from Iraq.316 Dozens of local ballot initiatives in communities
across the country called on the federal government to bring the troops
home from Iraq in the November 2006 elections.317 State governors
have also been openly critical of the U.S.’s involvement in the conflict in
Iraq.318
In March 2007, several towns in Vermont passed resolutions calling
for the impeachment of President Bush and Vice President Cheney. In
April 2007, the Vermont State Senate in a non-binding resolution called
on members of the U.S. House of Representatives to begin impeachment
proceedings against the President and Vice President because of their
actions in the United States and abroad, including Iraq. These calls for
Policy,
State
and
Local
Government
Resolutions
on
Cuba,
http://ciponline.org/cuba/trade/stateresmemo.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2007).
310. William Claiborne, Illinois Governor Defends Visit to Castro, WASH. POST, Oct. 29,
1999, at A2.
311. Id.
312. Id. After Ryan’s meeting with Castro, State Department spokesman James P. Rubin said
that personal visits with Castro should be avoided “to not give the impression that anyone supports
the oppression that he has visited on his people.” Id.
313. Carolyn Orr, To Trade or Not to Trade?, STATE GOVERNMENT NEWS, Nov./Dec. 2002, at
30, available at http://www.csg.org/pubs/Documents/sgn0212ToTradeOrNot.pdf.
314. Karen
Dolan,
Cities
for
Peace,
TOMPAINE.COM,
Nov.
10,
2006,
http://www.tompaine.com/articles/2006/11/10/cities_for_peace.php.
315. 57 of Vermont’s 251 cities and towns debated the proposal. Katie Zezima, National
Briefing: New England, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2005, at 25; Pam Belluck, Vermonters Vote on Study
of National Guard’s Role, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2005, at 12.
316. See generally, Code Pink, States That Are Working to Bring Their Guard Home,
http://www.codepinkalert.org/article.php?list=type&type=91 (last visited Apr. 18, 2007).
317. Wisconsin Network for Peace and Justice, State Referendum to Bring Our Troops Home,
http://www.wnpj.org/homenow (last visited Apr. 18, 2007).
318. Michael Blood, Schwarzenegger Cites Iraq ‘Mistakes’, WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 2006
(quoting Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger as stating that a lot mistakes were made by the U.S. in
Iraq).
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impeachment, which highlight a deep internal divide within the United
States over its policy in Iraq, were reported upon by media around the
world.319
States and localities have pushed to change U.S. foreign policy
more broadly as well. For example, after the failure of SALT II during
the Carter administration, the unwillingness of Reagan to support a
nuclear test ban treaty, and the development of the Strategic Defense
Initiative, citizens banded together to promote a freeze on the production
of nuclear weapons in the 1980s. Through town meetings, local
referenda, resolutions, or other initiatives, more than 900 local
governments acted on the freeze issue.320
After the end of the Cold War, at least 70 mayors in the United
States as well as hundreds of mayors from over 100 countries have
signed a statement in support of a nuclear free world.321 State
assemblies have similarly passed resolutions calling for the end of
nuclear weapons.322 Some states have taken a different approach
towards this national defense issue with at least 10 states having passed
resolutions calling upon the national government to deploy a missile
defense system since 1997.323
States have also urged the United States to sign and ratify
international agreements. For example, several state governments have
passed resolutions in support of the Convention on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).324
Often state and local action arises out of dissatisfaction with the
perceived inadequacy or incorrectness of a federal policy towards a
foreign policy issue. Catherine Powell calls the impact of state and local

319. Vermont state senate seeks to impeach Bush, Cheney, XINHUA, Apr. 21, 2007, available
at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-04/21/content_6006599.htm (last visited May 3, 2007);
Senators vote to impeach Bush, THE TIMES OF INDIA, Apr. 22, 2007, available at
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/World/Europe/Vermont_senators_vote_to_impeach_Bush_Chene
y/articleshow/1936513.cms (last visited May 3, 2007).
320. HOBBS, supra note 203, at 21.
321. Abolition Now!, Mayors for Peace Emergency Campaign to Ban Nuclear Weapons,
http://www.abolitionnow.org/site/c.lmK0JcNSJrF/b.1316337/k.9BB7/Mayors_for_Peace_Emergenc
y_Campaign_to_Ban_Nuclear_Weapons.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2007).
322. See
S.
J.
Res.
33,
Gen.
Assem.
(Conn.
2005),
available
at
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2005/fc/2005SJ-00033-R000489-FC.htm.
323. See Missilethreat.com, State Resolutions Calling for Missile Defense,
http://missilethreat.com/treaties/pageID.177/default.asp (last visited Apr. 18, 2007).
324. Laura Roskos, International Law, National Sovereignty, and Local Norms: What’s to
become of CEDAW in the U.S.?, THE BOSTON CONSORTIUM ON GENDER, SECURITY, AND HUMAN
RIGHTS
WORKING
PAPER
SERIES,
Aug.
2003,
at
32,
available
at
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/wappp/research/working/bc_roskos.pdf.
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laws on national foreign policy “dialogic federalism.”325 She argues that
enough local ordinances can create a norm cascade that affects federal
policy.326 The U.S. federal sanctions against South Africa passed by
Congress over President Reagan’s veto in 1986 were arguably in part a
result of just such a norm cascade created by anti-apartheid resolutions
and laws at the state and local level.327
In many ways, it is the mobilization of citizens around, more than
the passage of a resolution or act on a foreign policy issue that leads to a
norm cascade which changes federal policy. The effort required to
convince legislators and their fellow citizens to support a locality’s
official action gives citizens a tangible and reachable local goal to focus
their efforts on. This helps organize constituencies locally that can
develop into a national coalition. For example, someone who has
worked continuously to garner support for a local divestment initiative
on Sudan is also more likely to call their Congressperson to urge them to
pass the Darfur Accountability Act.
Norm cascades created by localities’ actions do not only impact the
policy they are directed at, but have a wider impact as well. For
instance, the South Africa or Sudan divestment campaigns can be seen
as national human rights moments. These are moments in which a
segment of the American public becomes unusually organized to
promote a human rights-based foreign policy goal. Most voters remain
generally unaware of how U.S. foreign policy implicates human rights in
other countries. Further, most voters do not base their vote on foreign
policy human rights issues. The signal given by these human rights
moments, however, creates an environment in which sympathetic
legislators and policymakers can prioritize human rights concerns in
other areas of foreign policy, knowing there is a constituency that
generally supports this type of action.
Local mobilization around human rights issues is not without its
drawbacks though. Local and state resolutions and laws may bring some
attention to human rights problems in other parts of the world, but not in
a timely manner. The Rwandan genocide occurred in 100 days. The
South African divestment campaign began in the late 1970s and only
built critical mass in the 1980s, decades after the creation of Apartheid.
The genocide in Sudan began in early 2003. The first resolution
condemning the Sudanese government was in late 2004 after tens of
325. Catherine Powell, Dialogic Federalism: Constitutional Possibilities for the Incorporation
of Human Rights Law in the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 245, 250 (2001).
326. Id. at 289.
327. HOBBS, supra note 203, at 30.
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thousands had already died. Although mobilization can happen
increasingly quickly in a more interconnected world, any policy change
that localities are able to bring about at the federal level will happen
relatively slowly.
Local actions might also unduly bias certain foreign policy
initiatives. Although the conflict in Sudan has inspired a large
divestment campaign, the devastating civil war in the Democratic
Republic of Congo at the turn of the twenty-first century inspired little
action on the state and local level.
Localities’ actions may also create the illusion of stronger support
for an issue than there actually is. When states and cities pass
resolutions condemning genocide in Sudan and calling for more action,
they may not have in mind the commitment of large amounts of U.S.
troops or resources. In this way, specific interest groups that are good at
organizing on the local level around human rights issues could have a
disproportionate effect on our foreign policy.
In the end though, localities can provide an important forum to
highlight foreign policy concerns of citizens and foster debate around
these issues. Localities can act as a refuge for dissent from national
foreign policy and as a spark for change.
Localities’ actions to influence foreign policy are often less
nuanced than what would occur at the federal level. This bluntness,
however, can still serve valuable ends. Localities may re-inject moral
weight into foreign policy discussions through strong stands against
slavery, genocide, apartheid, or sweatshop labor that often get lost in the
realpolitik of the nation’s foreign policy bureaucracies. Anger over local
jobs leaving the United States to countries with lower wages and less
regulation may result in “Buy America” laws. These laws register a
sense of disempowerment felt by citizens that federal agencies may not
fully recognize when they negotiate new trade agreements that result in
large movements of jobs and capital.
5. Adoption of International or Foreign Law
State and local governments also effect foreign relations by
adopting, citing, or borrowing from international law. In this way, they
take on international commitments and enter a discourse with
international institutions and other nations.
Such adoption of
international law has so far been rare, but their existence shows a
willingness of states and localities to take the lead in internalizing
international norms at their own impetus. Such adoption is also often in
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protest of the U.S.’s unwillingness to adopt these norms for the country
as a whole.
The City of San Francisco passed an ordinance in 1998 to make the
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW) part of its local law.328 The city created a CEDAW taskforce
to craft and monitor implementation of the Convention over a five year
period.329
In 2005, out of concern for how climate change will affect their
cities and frustration over the lack of leadership from the federal
government, a coalition of 132 mayors (representing nearly 29 million
people) pledged to meet the emission reduction requirements Kyoto
would have placed on them if the U.S. was a party.330 This is a nonbinding pledge, but has led to some city actions to reduce emissions.331
In Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court cited foreign law to contextualize its holding that a ban
on same-sex marriage was unconstitutional.332 The use of international
or foreign law is still rare outside citations to the Anglo-American
common law, however.
State and city governments will also share best practices with their
international counterparts on issues ranging from counterterrorism, to
human trafficking, and to good governance.333 In this way, components
of many foreign laws are incorporated into U.S. law through emulation.
V. ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS TO INCREASE PARTICIPATORY
DEMOCRACY
There have been a number of proposals to foster greater
participation in American democracy.334 Recently, James Fishkin and
Bruce Ackerman have put forth a strong argument to create a
328. S.F.,
CAL.,
ADMIN.
CODE
ch.
12K
(2001),
available
at
http://www.ci.sf.ca.us/site/cosw_page.asp?id=10849.
329. Mark Sappenfield, In One US City, Life Under a UN Treaty on Women, CHRISTIAN.SCI.
MON., Jan. 30, 2003, at 1.
330. Eli Sanders, Rebuffing Bush, 132 Mayors Embrace Kyoto Rules, N.Y. TIMES, May 14,
2005, at 9A.
331. Id.
332. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (citing Halpern v.
Toronto (City), [2003] 172 O.A.C. 276 (Can.) and Eagle Canada, Inc. v. Canada (Attorney Gen.),
[2003] 13 B.C.L.R. (4th) 1 (Can.)).
333. Ilene Grossman, Roles Differ but Goals are Similar for State, Provincial Lawmakers,
STATELINE, May 2005, http://www.csg.org/pubs/Documents/slmw-0505RolesDiffer.pdf.
334. For example, Benjamin Barber supports creating a system of neighborhood assemblies in
which citizens could routinely question their elected representatives on their concerns. BENJAMIN
BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE 270 (1984).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol40/iss4/3

66

Robinson: Citizens Not Subjects
ROBINSONFINAL.DOC

2007]

5/14/2007 12:48:46 PM

CITIZENS NOT SUBJECTS

713

deliberation day two weeks before major national elections.335 Citizens
would be paid to attend and gather in groups of 15 to 500. In these
groups, they would discuss the major issues in the next election.
Deliberative polling has shown that such civic engagement can have a
large impact on citizens’ voting behavior.336 The implementation of an
idea like deliberation day would also likely effect how voters voted on
foreign policy issues. After deliberative polling in Texas, voters were
more likely to find that the current level of foreign aid was about right
and that the U.S. should cooperate more with other countries militarily
to address trouble spots in the world.337
Indeed, if the goal is only to increase citizen discussion of foreign
relations, a proposal like deliberation day would certainly engage more
Americans than would result out of protecting localities’ role in foreign
relations. A proposal like deliberation day, however, does not address
the other federalism benefits of having localities involved in foreign
relations such as being laboratories for experimentation, a check on the
power of the federal government, or the promotion of local autonomy.
Instead, an idea like deliberation day is complimentary to localities’
involvement in foreign relations. After discussing federal foreign policy
in such a forum, members of a community may decide to work to take
additional local-based action on a foreign policy issue. For example,
they may work to create a sister-city or sister-state relationship in a
country the U.S. is aiding after a humanitarian disaster; institute
CEDAW principles in their locality’s governance; or divest their
community funds from a country that is committing egregious human
rights abuses. Further, the incidental foreign policy implications of
many localities’ actions are more likely to be brought to the attention of
voters during community discussion. This may influence how voters
look at issues and decisions that they once saw as purely domestic
concerns.
CONCLUSION
Courts should recognize localities as concurrent actors with the
federal government in U.S. foreign policy. The judiciary should strike
335. Ackerman and Fishkin propose that the holiday actually be two days so as many people
could participate as possible while businesses could still operate. Bruce Ackerman & James Fishkin,
Righting the Ship of Democracy, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Jan./Feb. 2004.
336. Id.
337. James Fishkin, Deliberative Polling: Toward a Better-Informed Democracy, CENTER FOR
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, available at http://cdd.stanford.edu/polls/docs/summary/#exec (last
visited Dec. 24, 2006).
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down localities’ actions that affect foreign relations only when they are
expressly preempted by the executive, Congress, or the Constitution. To
prosper in crafting foreign relations, however, localities need more than
judicial recognition of their coexisting control over American foreign
policy.
First, the federal government must actively support localities’ role
in foreign policy. The federal government should better integrate
localities into its foreign policy decision making. For example, states
are asked for some input by the United States Trade Representative
(USTR) on national trade policy, but they still do not play a lead role
during trade negotiations.338 In contrast, in Canada provinces play a
direct role in the creation of the nation’s trade policy. In 2003, Ontario
reportedly had more trade policy experts than all 50 states combined.339
The federal government should also ensure that its foreign policy
bureaucracy has interoperability at all levels of federalism. The USTR,
the State Department, the Treasury Department, and other divisions of
the federal government can provide the information they gather and
analyze not only to federal decision-makers, but also to state and local
decision-makers. In this way, the bureaucratic advantage that the federal
government has in many foreign policy areas is shared as best as
possible.
Second, localities should also view themselves as foreign policy
actors. Localities can organize themselves more effectively to cope with
governing in an internationally saturated environment. For instance,
some states have set up committees to study how trade policy is
affecting them and to craft appropriate responses.340 Others have set up
sub-cabinets to coordinate the state’s international relations.341
Finally, citizens themselves must recognize that localities have
338. The United States Trade Representative receives state input when it negotiates
international agreements from state and local officials that serve on its Intergovernmental Policy
Advisory Committee on Trade. Also state contact persons, usually the state chief economic or trade
development officer, are given information and asked for input while the USTR is in negotiations.
Jeremy Meadows, Consulting with States on Trade, STATE LEGISLATURES, Jul/Aug 2004, at 22.
339. WHATLEY, supra note 199, at 44.
340. In Texas, the Senate’s Committee on International Relations and Trade is charged with
examining the North American Free Trade Agreement and the state’s economic relationship with
Mexico. The California Senate Select Committee on International Trade Policy and State
Legislation studies the impacts of international trade agreements on state laws. Topics the
committee considers are environmental protection, natural resource management, human rights
protections, and public safety. Maine passed a bill in 2004 that established a public commission to
advise legislators regarding the economic impact of trade agreements on the state. Nick Steidel,
States Study Trade Policy, STATE LEGISLATURES, Jul/Aug 2004, at 23.
341. WHATLEY, supra note 199, at 41.
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become international actors. Americans may or may not be global
citizens, but they are certainly citizens with global worries. Americans
should view state and local governments as a place to express and act
upon many (although certainly not all) of these concerns.
Public recognition of the importance of localities’ involvement in
foreign policy is critical to ensure that this space is not taken by the
federal government. Localities are far from perfect foreign policy
actors, but American foreign policy is stronger with them engaged in
international relations. Further, without their engagement in foreign
affairs, there is a real danger American democracy will increasingly
become less accessible and participatory. Courts can protect the
available space left for localities in foreign relations, but it is ultimately
Americans who will determine their continuing relevance. As De
Tocqueville warned in Democracy in America in a passage that still
seems fitting today:
[A] highly civilized community can hardly tolerate a local
independence, is disgusted at its numerous blunders, and is apt to
despair of success before the experiment is completed. Again, the
immunities of townships, which have been obtained with so much
difficulty, are least of all protected against the encroachments of the
supreme power. They are unable to struggle, single-handed, against a
strong and enterprising government, and they cannot defend
themselves with success unless they are identified with the customs of
the nation and supported by public opinion.342

342. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 62.
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